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Pleasure, Desire and Practical Reason

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of stability in the constitution of pleasure and desire, its relevance to the intimate ways the two are related and to their role in the constitution of practical reason.

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Notes

  1. These terms seem to originate with Nowell-Smith (1954, pp 112ff). Nowell-Smith distinguishes “pro-attitudes” and “con-attitudes” denoting respectively favourable and unfavourable such attitudes. Most subsequent philosophical usage, most notably Davidson’s, in using “pro-attitude” for both the favourable and unfavourable subspecies.

  2. Compare Plato: “Consider then, said Socrates, if it be no mere possibility but a necessity that someone who desires desires what he lacks and where he is not lacking does not desire. At least, Agathon, it’s wonderfully clear to me that this is necessarily the case.” (Symp., 200a8–b2.)

  3. Lenman (2005). I regret my ignorance at the time of writing the latter of Humberstone’s rich discussion of similar issues in his 1990.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria Street, Sheffield, S3 7QB, UK

    James Lenman

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  1. James Lenman
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Correspondence to James Lenman.

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Lenman, J. Pleasure, Desire and Practical Reason. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 143–149 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9248-5

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