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Adaptability and Perspective

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Abstract

Ernest Sosa’s virtue perspectivism goes beyond standard reliabilism by requiring that agents with justified beliefs not only derive their beliefs from virtuous cognitive faculties but have an epistemic perspective that explains the origin of the beliefs and makes their belief-set coherent. I argue that Sosa’s account of the epistemic perspective does not ensure that the perspective will confer justification. An adequate epistemic perspective must establish a non-accidental connection between an agent’s use of a faculty in certain circumstances and its reliability in those circumstances. An agent who is capable of judging the reliability of her faculties in different situations will have a perspective that meets this requirement. Revising virtue perspectivism in this way also permits a stronger response to doxastic ascent arguments against the theory.

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Correspondence to Christopher Lepock.

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Lepock, C. Adaptability and Perspective. Philos Stud 129, 377–391 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1648-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1648-8

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