Abstract
In this paper, we closely examine the various ways in which a multi-party argumentative discussion—argumentative polylogue—can be analyzed in a dialectical framework. Our chief concern is that while multi-party and multi-position discussions are characteristic of a large class of argumentative activities, dialectical approaches would analyze and evaluate them in terms of dyadic exchanges between two parties: pro and con. Using as an example an academic committee arguing about the researcher of the year as well as other cases from argumentation literature, we scrutinize the advantages and pitfalls of applying a dialectical framework to polylogue analysis and evaluation. We recognize two basic dialectical methods: interpreting polylogues as exchanges between two main camps and splitting polylogues into a multitude of dual encounters. On the basis of this critical inquiry, we lay out an argument expressing the need for an improved polylogical model and propose its basic elements.
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Notes
We only discuss here the dialectical approach to analyzing and evaluating argumentative polylogues. There are of course other perspectives investigating argumentative (rhetoric, logic) or some other aspect of rationality in collective decision-making (decision theory, social choice theory, game theory, etc.). We notice though, that while they have much to recommend, none of them focuses on the analysis and evaluation of argumentation qua interaction to the extent that dialectical approaches do.
Exactly how they start the discussion is a secondary concern for our present purposes as ultimately whether they come in with established position or develop positions in the course of the conversation, they still must end up at a single choice based on their argumentative discussion of the options.
Since we speak here of actions to be taken (whom to award a prize) rather than beliefs in the strict sense, we put the belief-related terms such as truth and falsity in inverted commas. Of course, the decision to select a given candidate is, ideally, grounded in a belief that this is indeed the best researcher.
See Lewiński, forth., for a distinction between role-based dialectics, where arguers take up the roles of the proponents and opponents of given positions, and issue-based dialectics, where arguers examine the pros and cons of a given issue without making their case for a selected position on the issue.
A di-logue in which two parties trade arguments and criticisms is a paradigmatic object for dialectical analysis. However, monological reasoning can be also reconstructed as an internal critical dialogue (e.g., Blair 1998; Jacquette 2007; Johnson 2000). The possibilities and perils of dialectically reconstructing polylogues will be discussed in the remainder of the paper.
Walton’s framework of different dialectical dialogue types allows for a dynamic dialogical analysis of the entire procedure of activities such as deliberation; but such analyses take into account all communicative aspects of deliberation (proposal making, bargaining, preference aggregation, voting), rather than the strictly argumentative exchange of reasons and criticisms (Walton 1998, Ch. 6; McBurney et al. 2007; Rehg et al. 2005).
See van Rees’s (1995) study for the transcripts of entire exchanges and her detailed analysis.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969/1958) use the term “composite audience”; Zarefsky (2008) “heterogeneous audience”; van Eemeren (2010, p. 110) distinguishes between “multiple” audience (“consisting of individuals or subgroups having different positions in the difference of opinion”) and “mixed” audience (“consisting of individuals or subgroups having different starting points”).
In a pragma-dialectical analysis the first option where one proposition is asserted and doubted (α vs. α?), the so called “single non-mixed dispute”, is the most elementary dialectical form of disagreement into which all other types of disputes can be analytically broken (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 120); the second type (α vs. ¬α) is a “single mixed dispute” since the other arguer takes up a contradictory position on the same proposition, instead of merely expressing doubt against it. Further, there is a “multiple non-mixed dispute” in which a number of propositions is doubted (e.g., α ∧ β ∧ γ vs. (α ∧ β ∧ γ)?) and a “multiple mixed dispute” where a number of propositions is contradicted (e.g., α ∧ β ∧ γ vs. ¬(α ∧ β ∧ γ)). The last option is called a “qualitatively multiple dispute” (see van Eemeren et al. 2007, pp. 26–27) since two qualitatively exclusive (contrary) propositions (α vs. β) are discussed.
Bonevac claims that “[s]omeone seeking to defend a position against a variety of opponents at once, for example, must meet a number of constraints that cannot be understood as conjunctions of constraints applied to each dispute taken individually” (Bonevac 2003, pp. 454–455, see also Lewiński 2012).
Similarly to the differences between what is good in logical and dialectical approaches to argumentation, so thoroughly examined by Hamblin (1970).
One reviewer suggested that polylogical factors in argumentation analysis are basically rhetorical concerns. But we understand this as a difference different than the one between dialectic and rhetoric. We focus here precisely on the resolution-relevant moves which, as we argue, are not always simply dyadic. Our inquiry, then, begins in the realm of the “reasonable” and dialectical—rather than “strategic” and rhetorical—aspect of strategic maneuvering in polylogical argumentation. Therefore, we disagree with a “defeatist” position in which all polylogical facets of multi-party discussions are demoted to the status of purely rhetorical complications surrounding a dyadic dialectical dispute.
See Hamblin (1970, p. 216) for the distinction between safe and risky questions.
Note that it is at the confrontation stage where the fallacy of a false dilemma can be defined in a polylogical sense: “In a context where one can discuss many propositions (poly-lemma), a di-lemma is false, because it focuses exclusively on two positions, thus preventing other positions (standpoints) from being considered.” (Lewiński 2013b, p. 14).
“Even if the principle ‘No common logic, no communication’ held, it would not follow that there must be a one logic for each polylogue, only common ground for each pair of parties in a polylogue that manage to communicate.” (Sylvan 1985, p. 110).
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Lewiński, M., Aakhus, M. Argumentative Polylogues in a Dialectical Framework: A Methodological Inquiry. Argumentation 28, 161–185 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9307-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9307-x