Abstract
Many accounts of analogy based on sentential semantics owe their continued popularity more to a lack of theoretical specificity than to their superior explicative power. I examine a recent attempt to remedy this situation.
Conclusion: Once the sentential semantics account of analogy is spelled out in sufficient detail to permit its systematic application to a variety of cases, it quickly becomes apparent why it must fail, and why we should give preference to a multi-constraint theory of cognitive process instead.
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Lichter, T. Bill Clinton is the first lady of the USA: Making and unmaking analogies. Synthese 104, 285–297 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063873
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063873