Abstract
An influential anti-democratic argument says: ‘(1) Answers to political questions are truth-apt. (2) A small elite only—the epistocrats—knows these truths. (3) If answers to political questions are truth-apt, then those with this knowledge about these matters should rule. (4) Thus, epistocrats should rule.’ Many democrats have responded by denying (1), arguing that, say, answers to political questions are a matter of sheer personal preference. Others have rejected (2), contending that knowledge of the true answers to political questions is evenly distributed. David Estlund finds neither of these replies conclusive. Instead, he attacks (3) arguing that there can be no agreement between qualified people as to who the epistocrats are and that people are not subject to being ruled by experts, whose status as such they can reasonably dispute. Critically, I argue that this argument does not block all forms of epistocratic argument and that Estlund fails to consider the full range of plausible epistocratic views. More constructively, I offer a modest argument for why greater expertise does not necessarily warrant greater political authority. Presumably, the set of feasible options might differ, depending on what procedure is used, and a sub-optimal choice by nonepistocrats from a better set might be superior to the optimal choice by epistocrats from a worse set. In such cases, the mere fact of greater expertise does not warrant political authority, i.e., (3) is false.
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Notes
Mill believes that almost everyone should be enfranchised. People who receive parish relief and children should have no right to vote (Mill 1987, p. 305).
The modal scope of the privileged knowledge claim is unclear. Even if there are no inequalities in political knowledge, such inequalities could obtain, perhaps because we actively brought up some people to become political knowers and actively prevented others from becoming so.
By authority Estlund means ‘the moral power of one agent… to morally require or forbid actions by others through commands’ (Estlund 2008, p. 2). I am not sure that there is a fallacious inference here as opposed to a false claim about authority-conferring properties. For further discussion of the ‘expert/boss fallacy’ see (Gaus 2011).
Estlund does not specify the general acceptability criterion in much detail. Specifically, if children are citizens, I am not certain that he really endorses the principle. See also (Anderson 2008, p. 136). Also, the principle’s scope does not extend to invidious comparisons of citizens’ non-normative wisdom. Assuming, however, that such knowledge is relevant to overall political wisdom, it seems that the principle, as stated here, allows invidious comparisons of overall political wisdom of citizens.
(2) and (3) as I have formulated them are ambiguous with regard to the issue of specification raised here.
(List 2005). Cristina Lafont makes a related point (Lafont (forthcoming)).
One could imagine further ways of fine-grading epistocratic views.
Some studies indicate that higher education is inversely correlated with racial prejudice, xenophobia etc. (see for example Rydgren 2008, p. 755).
I owe this formulation to an anonymous reviewer of this journal. See also (Estlund 2008, p. 219). I am skeptical of Estlund’s view that ‘an extra element’ of authority must meet the ‘qualified acceptability requirement’ (in the absence of which equal authority (here: one person, one vote) has ‘default status’), whereas its absence need not. However, the present objection proceeds independently of this scepticism.
An objection to p might be qualified as such even if it is not qualified when put forward by a particular objector, e.g. because the objector concedes or ought to concede (given the other things she believes) that there is reason to believe that an analogous objection applies to q, even though in fact it does not so apply. I concede this, and contend that the general acceptability condition is best understood as being concerned with qualities of objections qua being put forward by certain objectors, since the determinants of when a particular person can put forward a qualified objection might be irrelevant to legitimacy and justice. By way of illustration of the last claim: suppose there is a true moral principle that everyone rejects. In that case people cannot put forward a qualified objection to a scheme that conflicts with this principle.
Quong (2010, p. 39) makes the same claim.
Estlund mentions, without addressing, this problem (Estlund 2003, p. 68n17).
The thought might be that invidious comparisons favouring adults over children are not demeaning to children. But if that is so, we are back to non-epistemic justifications of differential authority.
Admittedly, passing the general acceptability test is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for authority. Hence, I am not claiming that Estlund is committed to hold epistocracy to be justified in the Nazi-majority case.
I do not imply that Estlund should have addressed the issue. No treatment of any topic can be complete.
The view that laws are more likely to be obeyed when those subjected to them have been involved in their adoption goes back to Marsilius of Padua (2005) at least.
For instance, it may be psychologically much easier to sacrifice one’s self-interest to implement a political decision one has participated in making than to do so to implement a decision made by someone whom one recognizes as an epistocrat.
The setting I have in mind here is the setting of offering an anti-epistocratic argument that is different from, but constructively supplements, that of Estlund.
In one sense at least, the motivational constraint would apply even at the level of ideal theory, not at the level of partial compliance theory.
References
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Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this paper were presented at workshops at CSMN, University of Oslo, 8 December 2009 and at Yale, 22 October 2011. I thank Lene Bomann-Larsen, Jacob Busch, Jakob Elster, Jon Elster, Hans Fink, Søren Flinch Midtgaard, Robert Huseby, Cristina Lafont, Hélène Landemore, Mats Lundström, Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Raffaele Rodogno, Bo Rothstein, Rasmus Sommer Hansen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Susan Stokes, Andrew Williams, and, in particular, David Estlund for helpful criticisms.
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Lippert-Rasmussen, K. Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique. Res Publica 18, 241–258 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9179-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9179-1