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Exploitation as Wrongful Use: Beyond Taking Advantage of Vulnerabilities

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Abstract

The notion that exploitation consists in taking wrongful advantage of another’s vulnerability is widespread in the philosophical literature. Considering the popularity of this view, it is disappointing to find that very few authors attempt to provide substantive accounts of characteristics they consider relevant vulnerabilities (i.e., those pertinent to exploitation), as well as of relevant features which make taking advantage of those vulnerabilities wrongful. In this paper, I analyze the few approaches (notably those presented by Ruth Sample and Robert Goodin) that in fact provide such accounts, and I examine whether and how they pertain to exploitation in general, as well as to exploitation in more personal/intimate relationships. I conclude that these vulnerability-based accounts of exploitation are either too vague or too restrictive, since they tend to leave out many instances of exploitation (especially those within personal and intimate relationships), and are as such inadequate.

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Notes

  1. For an especially convincing argument in favor of the concept of ‘consensual exploitation,’ see Wertheimer’s Exploitation (1996), as well as his Coercion (1987).

  2. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this objection.

  3. The account of reflective equilibrium is introduced on p. 18.

  4. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for insisting on addressing this issue.

  5. For a useful overview of the literature on vulnerabilities in connection with health issues, see Ruof 2004.

  6. Interestingly, Michael Kottow proposes notions of vulnerability and susceptibility that seem diametrically opposed to those put forward by Carse and Little. Kottow argues that being vulnerable is a descriptive characteristic of human beings qua humans: it means that we are fragile, but can be nevertheless intact (Kottow 2003, p. 281). To be susceptible, on the other hand, involves “being injured and predisposed to compound additional harm” (Kottow 2004, p. 460). However, I find that most authors understand these two notions as presented by Carse and Little, which is how I will be using them throughout this text.

  7. This example is based on the motion picture Unhook the Stars (1997), directed by Nick Cassavetes, starring Gena Rowlands as Mildred and Marisa Tomei as Monica.

  8. I have noticed that not everyone agrees that Susan has been wrongfully used in this example. If you find the scenario unconvincing, I suggest you sidestep it and focus on the example that follows this one (a rich man “buying” his mistress) which has so far yielded general agreement that it involves exploitation. While I feel that the two examples merit similar analyses, my overall criticism of vulnerability-based accounts persists as long as we can find at least some cases of exploitation which involve taking advantage of a mere desire, rather than a basic need.

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Logar, T. Exploitation as Wrongful Use: Beyond Taking Advantage of Vulnerabilities. Acta Anal 25, 329–346 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0089-6

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