Abstract
We present a modal logic called \({\mathcal{LIA}}\) (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of \({\mathcal{LIA}}\), we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Audi R. (1982). A theory of practical reasoning. American Philosophical Quarterly 19: 25–39
Baltag, A., Moss, L., & Solecki, S. (1998). The logic of public announcements, common knowledge and private suspicions. In Proc. seventh conference on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge (TARK ’98) (pp. 43–56). San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Belnap N., Perloff M. and Xu M. (2001). Facing the future: Agents and choices in our indeterminist world. Oxford University Press, New York
Blackburn P., Venema Y. and Rijke M. (2001). Modal logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Brand M. (1984). Intending and acting. MIT Press, Cambridge
Bratman M. (1984). Two faces of intention. Philosophical Review 93: 375–405
Bratman M. (1987). Intentions, plans and practical reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Broersen J., Dastani M., Hulstijn J. and van der Torre L. (2002). Goal generation in the BOID architecture. Cognitive Science Quarterly 2(3–4): 428–447
Broome J. (2002). Practical reasoning. In: Bermudez, J. and Millar, A. (eds) Reason and nature: Essays in the theory of rationality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Castilho M.A., Gasquet O. and Herzig A. (1999). Formalizing action and change in modal logic I: The frame problem. Journal of Logic and Computation 9(5): 701–735
Cohen P.R. and Levesque H.J. (1990). Intention is choice with commitment. Artificial Intelligence 42: 213–261
Danto, A. (1965). Basic actions. American Philosophical Quarterly 141–148.
Davidson, D. (1980). Agency. In Essays on actions and events. New York: Oxford University Press.
Davis L. (1979). Theory of action. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
Dignum F. and Conte R. (1998). Intentional agents and goal formation. In: Singh, M.P., Rao, A. and Wooldridge, M. (eds) Agent theories, architectures, and languages: Agent theories, architectures, and languages (ATAL-97), pp 231–243. Springer Verlag, Berlin
Dunin-Keplicz B. and Verbrugge R. (2002). Collective intentions. Fundamenta Informaticae 51(3): 271–295
Elgesem, M. (1993). Action theory and modal logic. PhD thesis, University of Oslo.
Elster J. (1979). Ulysses and the sirens. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Fagin R., Halpern J., Moses Y. and Vardi M. (1995). Reasoning about knowledge. MIT Press, Cambridge
Frith C., Blakemore S. and Wolpert D. (2000). Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences 355: 1771–1788
Gabbay, D., Pnueli, A., Shelah, S., & Stavi, J. (1980). On the temporal analysis of fairness. In Proc. seventh ACM symposium on principles of programming languages (pp. 163–173). Las Vegas, NV.
Gerbrandy, J. (1999). Bisimulations on planet kripke. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Ginet C. (1990). On action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Goldblatt R. (1992). Logics of time and computation. CSI Lecture Notes, Stanford, California
Goldman A. (1970). A theory of human action. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
Grosz B. and Kraus S. (1996). Collaborative plans for complex group action. Artificial Intelligence 86(2): 269–357
Harel D.K.D. and Tiuryn J. (2000). Dynamic logic. MIT Press, Cambridge
Harman G. (1986). Change in view: Principles of reasoning. The MIT Press, Cambridge
Herzig, A., & Longin, D. (2004). C&L intention revisited. In Proc. ninth international conference on principles on principles of knowledge representation and reasoning (KR 2004) (pp. 527–535). AAAI Press.
Hornsby J. (1980). Actions. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
Horty J.F. and Belnap N. (1995). The deliberative STIT: A study of action, omission and obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24(6): 583–644
Israel, D., Perry, J., & Tutiya, S. (1991). Actions and movements. In Proc. 12th international joint conference on artificial intelligence (IJCAI ’91) (pp. 1060–1065). San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Jordan M.I. and Wolpert D.M. (1999). Computational motor control. In: Gazzaniga, M. (eds) The cognitive neuroscience. MIT Press, Cambridge
Kanger S. (1971). New foundations for ethical theory. In: Hilpinen, R. (eds) Deontic logic: Introductory and systematic readings, pp 36–58. D. Reidel, Dordrecht
Konolige, K., & Pollack, M. E. (1993). A representationalist theory of intention. In Proc. 13th international joint conference on artificial intelligence (IJCAI ’93) (pp. 390–395). San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Locke J. (1989). An essay concerning human understanding. Clarendon Press, Oxford
McCann H. (1986). Rationality and the range of intention. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 191–211
McCann H. (1991). Settled objectives and rational constraints. American Philosophical Quarterly 28: 25–36
Mele A.R. (1992). Springs of action: Understanding intentional behavior. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Meyer J.J.C., van der Hoek W. and Van Linder B. (1999). A logical approach to the dynamics of commitments. Artificial Intelligence 113(1–2): 1–40
Miller K. and Sandu G. (1997). Weak commitments. In: Holmstron-Hintikka, G. and Tuomela, R. (eds) Contemporary action theory, vol. 2: Social action. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
O’Shaughnessy B. (1992). Trying (as the Mental ‘Pineal Gland’). Journal of Philosophy 70: 365–386
Pacherie E. (2006). Towards a dynamic theory of Intentions. In: Pockett, S., Banks, W.P. and Gallagher, S. (eds) Does consciousness causes behavior? An investigation on the nature of volition. MIT Press, Cambridge
Panzarasa P., Jennings N. and Norman T.J. (2002). Formalising collaborative decision making and practical reasoning in multi-agent systems. Journal of Logic and Computation 12(1): 55–117
Pörn, I. (1977). Action theory and social science: Some formal models. Dordrecht: Synthese Library 120, D. Reidel.
Proust J. (2005). La nature de la volonté. Folio-Gallimard, Paris
Rao, A. S., & Georgeff, M. P. (1991a). Asymmetry thesis and side-effect problems in linear time and branching time intention logics. In Proc. twelfth international joint conference on artificial intelligence (IJCAI ’91) (pp. 498–504).
Rao, A. S., & Georgeff, M. P. (1991b). Modelling rational agents within a BDI architecture. In Proc. second international conference on principles of knowledge representation and reasoning (KR ’91). San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Reiter R. (2001). Knowledge in action: Logical foundations for specifying and implementing dynamical systems. MIT Press, Cambridge
Santos, F., Carmo, J., & Jones, A. (1997a). Action concepts for describing organised interaction. In Thirtieth annual Hawaii international conference on system sciences (pp. 373–382). Los Alamitos, California: IEEE Computer Society Press.
Santos F., Jones A. and Carmo J. (1997). Responsibility for action in organizations: A formal model. In: Holmstron-Hintikka, G. and Tuomela, R. (eds) Contemporary action theory, vol. 2: Social action. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
Scherl R.B. and Levesque H. (2003). Knowledge, action and the frame problem. Artificial Intelligence 144: 1–39
Schroeder S. (2001). The concept of trying. Philosophical Investigations 24(3): 213–227
Searle J. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press, New York
Segerberg K. (1989). Bringing it about. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18: 327–347
Segerberg K. (1992). Getting started: Beginnings in the logic of action. Studia Logica 51(3–4): 347–378
Sellars W. (1967). Science and metaphysics: Variations on Kantian themes. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Shoham Y. (1993). Agent-oriented programming. Artificial Intelligence 60: 51–92
Singh M. and Asher N. (1993). A logic of intentions and beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22: 513–544
Thomason, R. (2000). Desires and defaults: A framework for planning with inferred goals. In Proceedings seventh international conference on principles of knowledge representation and reasoning (KR 2000) (pp. 702–713), Morgan Kaufmann.
Van Benthem, J., & Pacuit, E. (2006). The tree of knowledge in action: Towards a common perspective. In G. Governatori, I. Hodkinson, & Y. Venema (Eds.), Proceedings of advances in modal logic, vol. 6 (AiML 2006) (pp. 87–106). College Publications.
Van der Hoek W., Jamroga W., and Wooldridge M. (2007). Towards a theory of intention revision. Synthese 155(2): 265–290
Van Linder B., van der Hoek W., and Meyer J.-J.C. (1998). Formalising abilities and opportunities. Fundamenta Informaticae 34: 53–101
Von Wright G.H. (1963). Norm and action. Routledge and Kegan, London
Von Wright G.H. (1972). On so-called practical inference. The Philosophical Review 15: 39–53
Wallace R.J. (2001). Normativity, commitment and instrumental reason. Philosophers’ Imprint 1(3): 55–117
Wooldridge M. (2000). Reasoning about rational agents. MIT Press, Cambridge