Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 483 forties, presumably lasted until the sixties.) And even Diderot's subsequent philosophy of "Pbre ToutMous," as he laughingly described himself to Sophie (p. 92), when he more rcalistically accepted the primacy of passions and the existence of some evil in everyone and rejected the more optimistic philosophy of Shaftesbury--so "disastrously coopted by Rousseau" (p. 93)--conflicted with the hypocrisy supposedly practiced by him. In short, the behavior Blum attributes to Diderot throughout most of his life would have made him guilty of practicing the very "simulacrum of morality" he condemned in others. In support of Professor Blum, I do to a certain extent concur that "Diderot's philosophe was his own creation, giving performances finely calculated to impress the audience" (p. 112). In varying degrees, however, this could probably be said of every "philosophe." Perhaps, along with many critics, we have had too flattering an image of Diderot, and Blum's portrait may be a necessary corrective. One thing is certain: Blum has made a fine contribution to Diderot studies with this highly readable work that holds one's attention throughout. This is not an insignificant accomplishment for a book that contains a wealth of scholarly knowledge and insights, not only where Diderot is concerned, but likewise on many other important literary figures of the eighteenth century. Rice University VIRGILW. TOPAZIO Kant's Aesthetic Theory. By Donald W. Crawford (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. Pp. 189. $12.50) Professor Crawford's exposition of Kant's aesthetic theory is remarkably free from special pleading. The author does not play fast and loose with the "supersensible," and difficult concepts and passages are explored fully before they are explained in terms of what the author takes to be Kant's actual argument. Crawford contends that the "Analytic of the Beautiful," the "Analytic of Sublime," and the "Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgment," namely Part I of the Critique o[ ludgment , form a unified argument and self-contained aesthetic theory. He also contends that the theory deals with the central issues in aesthetics and contains ideas which are seminal for aesthetics as a whole. That these contentions are not new testifies to the perennial challenge of the third Critique and underscores the recent renewed interest in Kant. Crawford's argument for the unity of Kant's aesthetic theory goes as follows: When Kant characterizes the judgment of taste as aesthetic he establishes the first "cornerstone" of his theory because this characterization forms the thesis of the antinomy of taste, i.e., that the judgment of taste is subjective. When Kant characterizes the judgment of taste as disinterested he forms the second cornerstone of his argument because this paves the way for the justification of the claim to universality. We are told that disinterestedness belongs to the logic of the judgment of taste, but not to the deduction of it. The deduction , proper, proceeds in five stages. In Stage I, Kant argues that if the judgment of taste is to claim universality, it must be based on a universally communicable state of mind. In Stage II, Kant shows that this state of mind is found in the harmony between the imagination and the understanding, the harmony requisite for cognition in general. In Stage III, Kant argues that the harmony is negotiated by the purposiveness of the form of the object. In Stage IV, Kant finds the ultimate justification and the source of the claim to universality in the common sense. Professor Crawford maintains that Stages I-IV justify the claim to universality only. They do not justify the necessity of the judgment, the demand for agreement as a duty. When, in Stage V, Kant argues that beauty in art and in nature is a symbol of a moral idea he can then argue that sensitivity to beauty can justifiably be demanded as a duty. 484 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Crawford's crucial move stems from the thesis that the first four stages are incomplete . They establish only the claim to universality. They do not establish the necessity of the judgment, i.e., the validity of the demand for agreement as a duty. If this second justification is not found, then that demand...