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Generalizing empirical adequacy I: multiplicity and approximation

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Abstract

I provide an explicit formulation of empirical adequacy, the central concept of constructive empiricism, and point out a number of problems. Based on one of the inspirations for empirical adequacy, I generalize the notion of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relation of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy with the help of approximation sets to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application of these generalizations to a simple interference phenomenon.

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Notes

  1. Note that this auxiliary theory could also be assumed to describe a measurement device. This assumption would arguably fit better with scientific practice and would not require any modification of the formalism or the subsequent calculations. However, it would go against the distinguished status that constructive empiricism confers upon human perception.

  2. Clearly, these are radically simplifying assumptions about the eye’s physiology, but a more realistic account would complicate things considerably without leading to philosophical insights relevant for the following discussion.

  3. Note that \(|D(x)|\le 1\) also for \(x\in \bigl [0,1/[2\pi ]\bigr )\), unlike \(1/(2\pi x)\).

  4. I thank Leszek Wroński for this point.

  5. For reasons that are not entirely clear, this notational convention has become a philosophical point of both contention and confusion. Van Fraassen (1989, p. 366, n. 4), for example, objects to structures being “yolked to a particular syntax”, where ‘syntax’ seems to stand for ‘set of non-logical symbols in the object language’ (see n. 15). And French and Ladyman (1999, p. 115) see support for van Fraassen’s position in the definition of ‘structure’ given by Hodges (1993), which, however, assigns a particular set of non-logical symbols to each structure (cf. Lutz 2014a, §3).

  6. To be precise: if \(f:T_m\longrightarrow T_n\) is an isomorphism between \(\mathfrak {T} _m\) and \(\mathfrak {T} _n\), then the set \(\mathbf {E} _n\) of empirical substructures that corresponds to \(\mathbf {E} _m\) contains all and only those structures \(\mathfrak {E} \) for which there is an \(\mathfrak {E} '\in \mathbf {E} _m\) such that \(f\) is an isomorphism between \(\mathfrak {E} '\) and \(\mathfrak {E} \).

  7. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this analysis.

  8. In contradistinction, Muller (1997, p. 2) defines an empirical substructure to be any substructure that is isomorphic to an appearance. He therefore assumes that a theory has no distinguished empirical substructures independently of the appearances. (As Muller points out, if there is only one appearance that is relevant for the theory and the theory is empirically adequate according to Muller’s definition, the theory has exactly one empirical substructure. If there are more appearances, that same theory can have more empirical substructures).

  9. This is decidedly not what van Fraassen in general assumes (personal email from June 15, 2011), and it is also incompatible with his definitions of appearances and empirical adequacy quoted above: The “structures” (plural) given by measurements are appearances, and in the case of empirical adequacy, “all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures” (plural) of a single model. Some philosophers of science, e. g. Przełęcki, have claimed (independently of constructive empiricism) that the appearances are plausibly always expressible in a single structure; others, e. g. Sneed and Wójcicki, have defended the opposite (see Przełęcki 1974b, p. 103, and references therein).

  10. If the family \(\{\mathbf {E} _n\}_{n\in N}\) is understood as determined by the appearances (see n. 8) and ‘substructure’ is taken to mean ‘relativized reduct’ (see §5.1), Muller (1997, p. 2) also relies on idiosyncratic empirical adequacy. Thus while his discussion of the relation of wave and matrix mechanics “can be regarded [ ...] as a morsel of applied philosophy of science”, it cannot be regarded an application of van Fraassen’s philosophy of science.

  11. Since Suárez (2005) argues that van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy is too strong, his use of idiosyncratic empirical adequacy thus does not threaten his conclusion.

  12. See n. 1.

  13. The qualifier ‘non-trivial’ is essential: A theory that says next to nothing about anything is likely to be empirically adequate (Worrall 1984, §3; Percival 2007, p. 87; Lutz 2014b, §6), but restricting scientific research to such theories would be cold comfort. Note that empirical adequacy is still a weaker requirementthan truth, which would amount to the existence of an isomorphism between one of the models of the theory and (the structure of) the world.

  14. I do not endorse van Fraassen’s argument. For my point it is only important that the argument presumes that theories can be described as classes of model theoretic structures. In fact, I think that van Fraassen’s position is wrong and the exchange between Worrall, Friedman, and van Fraassen is a red herring, since, first, the paradigmatic syntactic approach of the logical empiricists explicitly assumes higher order logic (Lutz 2012, §2), and second, empirical adequacy can provably be expressed in higher order logic (Lutz 2014b).

  15. Incidentally, since van Fraassen relies on model theory, his alleged freedom from being “yolked to a particular syntax” can only amount to the freedom from a particular set of non-logical symbols in the object language as it is found in the definitions by Bell and Slomson (1974). For even in those definitions, the use of a model theoretic structure always fixes a particular syntax up to the choice of a set of non-logical symbols (cf. Lutz 2014a, §3).

  16. It is hence fascinating to see Przełęcki ’s work cited as a precursor or even an elaboration of the semantic view (da Costa and French 1990, p. 249; Volpe 1995, p. 566), even though the semantic view, in which van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy is phrased, is usually considered to be diametrically opposed to the received, or “syntactic”, view.

  17. For a more thorough discussion of Przełęcki ’s formalism, see Lutz (2013).

  18. This is a slight generalization of Przełęcki ’s account, who assumes that \(B\) is an interval of reals, which would therefore have to be in \(A\).

  19. \(F_j^{+\circ }\) is the union of an approximate relation symbol’s positive and neutral extensions.

  20. Hodges (1993, pp. 202–203) defines relativized reducts as those substructures of a reduct that have the extension of some one place predicate as their domain. I use a slight generalization.

  21. Since this again weakens his notion of empirical adequacy, his overall argument remains unaffected (see n. 11).

  22. Of course, Muller does not claim to be using van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy.

  23. I thank Albert Visser for this point.

  24. This holds for \(p/\lambda <1/(2\pi )\) (see n. 2).

  25. The generalization even allows treating a non-blurred interference pattern as appearance, and the blurred interference pattern as an epistemic appearance. Of course, this would go against the distinguished status that constructive empiricism confers upon human perception.

  26. Although I would call it ‘approximate empirical embedding’.

  27. I thank Leszek Wroński for the suggestion to allow infinitely many levels. Note that the kind of hierarchy described here is very different from the hierarchy of structures described by Suppes (1962), which at least prima facie does not describe an increase in empirical information, but rather a successive change of structures given the same information.

  28. Note that one could also express successive improvements in the precision of measurements through measuring devices in terms of hierarchies of epistemic appearances. Of course, this would again go against the distinguished status that constructive empiricism confers upon human perception.

  29. In definitions and claims here and in the following, text in brackets has to be either systematically included or omitted, thus leading to two different definitions and claims.

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Acknowledgments

A very early version of this paper has been presented at Herman Philipse’s Dutch Research Seminar in Analytic Philosophy at Utrecht University. Many thanks to the participants and Anthony Booth, Otávio Bueno, and Thomas Müller for very helpful discussions, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Many of the definitions are inspired by, but differ significantly from those given by Bueno (1997). Part of the research for this article was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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Correspondence to Sebastian Lutz.

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This article is dedicated to the memory of Marian Przełęcki.

Appendix: Proofs

Appendix: Proofs

Claim 1

For some appearances \(\mathbf {A}\), some theories are idiosyncratically empirically adequate but not empirically adequate.

Proof

Let the appearances be given by the set of the two structures \(\{\langle \{1, 2\},\{1,2\}\rangle ,\langle \{3,4\},\{3\}\rangle \}\). Let the theory be given by the family with members \(\mathfrak {T} _1=\langle \{0,1,2, \},\{0,1,2\}\rangle \) and \(\mathfrak {T} _2=\langle \{3,4,5\},\{3\}\rangle \) as well as the singleton sets of empirical substructures \(\mathbf {E} _1=\{\langle \{1, 2\},\{1,2\}\rangle \}\) and \(\mathbf {E} _2=\{\langle \{3,4\},\{3\}\rangle \}\). Let all other models of the theory be isomorphic to \(\mathfrak {T} _1\) or \(\mathfrak {T} _2\) and have the corresponding empirical substructures. Then the theory is idiosyncratically empirically adequate by virtue of the identity mapping on each of the appearances’ domains, but it is not empirically adequate. \(\square \)

Claim 2

For some appearances \(\mathbf {A}\) and theory \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \), \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate given \(\mathbf {A}\), but \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) has no model such that all appearances in \(\mathbf {A}\) are empirical substructures of that model.

Proof

Let the appearances be given by the set of the two structures \(\{\langle \{a, b\},\{a,b\}\rangle ,\langle \{c,d\},\{c\}\rangle \}\), where \(a,b,c\), and \(d\) are distinct objects. Let the theory be given by the family with the member \(\mathfrak {T} _1=\langle \{1,2,3\},\{1,2\}\rangle \) and the set of empirical substructures \(\mathbf {E} _1=\{\langle \{1, 2\},\{1,2\}\rangle , \langle \{2,3\},\{2\}\rangle \}\). Let all other models of the theory be isomorphic to \(\mathfrak {T} _1\) and have the corresponding empirical substructures. Then the theory is empirically adequate, but every bijection from \(\{1,2,3\}\)—and thus every isomorphism for \(\mathfrak {T} _1\)—maps \(2\), the object shared by the empirical substructures, to a single object. Since the domains of the appearances do not share an element, the appearances therefore can never be empirical substructures of the same model of the theory. \(\square \)

Claim 3

A theory \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically empirically adequate for epistemic appearances \(\mathbf {A}\) if and only if there are epistemically possible appearances \(\mathbf {A} '\) such that \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} '\).

Proof

\(\Rightarrow \)’: \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A}\) if and only if there is some \(n\in N\) such that for every \(\mathbf {Q} \in \mathbf {A} \), there are \(\mathfrak {A} \in \mathbf {Q} \) and \(\mathfrak {E} \in \mathbf {E} _n\) with \(\mathfrak {E} \cong \mathfrak {A} \). For each \(\mathbf {Q}\), choose \(e(\mathbf {Q})=\mathfrak {A} \). Then there is some \(n\in N\) such that for every \(\mathfrak {A} \in \mathbf {A} '\), there is an \(\mathfrak {E} \in \mathbf {E} _n\) with \(\mathfrak {E} \cong \mathfrak {A} \), so that \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} '\).

\(\Leftarrow \)’: Similar. \(\square \)

Claim 4

Let \(\mathbf {A}\) be appearances, and \(\mathbf {A} '=\{\{\mathfrak {A} \}\mathop {:}\mathfrak {A} \in \mathbf {A} \}\) be epistemic appearances. Then \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A}\) if and only if \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} '\).

Proof

Given the epistemic appearances \(\mathbf {A} '=\{\{\mathfrak {A} \}\mathop {:}\mathfrak {A} \in \mathbf {A} \}\), the only epistemically possible appearances are given by \(\mathbf {A}\). Claim 4 now follows from Claim 3. \(\square \)

Claim 5

Let \(\langle \{\mathbf {A} _l\}_{l\in L},C\rangle \) be a hierarchy of epistemic appearances. If theory \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} _l, l\in L\), then \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically empirically adequate for any \(\mathbf {A} _k, k\in L, k\le l\). If theory \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is not epistemically empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} _l, l\in L\), then \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is not epistemically empirically adequate for any \(\mathbf {A} _m, m\in L, m\ge l\).

Proof

By Definition 14, for any \(k\le l\) and any \(\mathbf {Q} \in \mathbf {A} _k\), there is a \(b\) such that \(b(\mathbf {Q})\in \mathbf {A} _l\) and \(b(\mathbf {Q})\subseteq \mathbf {Q} \). Thus, if \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} _l\), there is some \(n\in N\) such that for every \(\mathbf {Q} \in \mathbf {A} _k\), there are an \(\mathfrak {A} \in b(\mathbf {Q})\subseteq \mathbf {Q} \) and an \(\mathfrak {E} \in \mathbf {E} _n\) with \(\mathfrak {E} \cong \mathfrak {A} \). The proof of the claim’s second conjunct is similar. \(\square \)

Claim 6

\(\langle \{\mathbf {A} _l\}_{l\in L},C\rangle \) is a (restricted) hierarchy of approximate appearances if and only if the following holds: For any \(l\le m\) with \(l,m\in L\), there is an injection (bijection) \(b:\mathbf {A} _l\longrightarrow \mathbf {A} _m\) in \(C\) such that for all \(\mathbf {Q} \in \mathbf {A} _l\) with \(\{R_i^+,R_i^-,F_j^{+\circ },c_k^{+\circ }\}_{i\in I,j\in J,k\in K}\) and for \(b(\mathbf {Q})\in \mathbf {A} _m\) with \(\{\tilde{R}_i^+,\tilde{R}_i^-,\tilde{F}_j^{+\circ },\tilde{c}_k^{+\circ }\}_{i\in I,j\in J,k\in K}\) it holds that \(R_i^+\subseteq \tilde{R}_i^+,\,R_i^-\subseteq \tilde{R}_i^-,\,\tilde{F}_j^{+\circ }\subseteq F_j^{+\circ }\), and \(\tilde{c}_j^{+\circ }\subseteq c_j^{+\circ }\) for all \(i\in I, j\in J, k\in K\).

Proof

\(\Rightarrow \)’: By Definition 14, there is an injection (bijection) \(b:\mathbf {A} _l\longrightarrow \mathbf {A} _m\) in \(C\) such that for all \(\mathbf {Q},\,b(\mathbf {Q})\subseteq \mathbf {Q} \). The claim follows from (14)–(17).

\(\Leftarrow \)’: Immediate. \(\square \)

Claim 7

\(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically/approximately empirically adequate at all points of all restricted hierarchies of epistemic/approximate appearances with the initial sequence \(\langle \mathbf {A} _l\rangle _{l\le m}\) if and only if \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for all appearances that are epistemically possible given \(\mathbf {A} _m\).

Proof

\(\Rightarrow \)’: Assume \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is restrictedly epistemically/approximately adequate at all points of all hierarchies of epistemic appearances with the initial sequence \(\langle \mathbf {A} _l\rangle _{l\le m}\). For all appearances \(\mathbf {A} \) that are epistemically possible given \(\mathbf {A} _l\), the sequence \(\langle \mathbf {A} _m,\mathbf {A} '\rangle _{l\le m}\) with \(\mathbf {A} '=\{\{\mathfrak {A} \}\mathop {:}\mathfrak {A} \in \mathbf {A} \}\) as its last element is a hierarchy of epistemic/approximate appearances. Therefore \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} '\), and thus, by Claim 4, \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} \).

\(\Leftarrow \)’: For any point \(\mathbf {A} _r\) of any hierarchy with initial sequence \(\langle \mathbf {A} _l\rangle _{l\le m}\), there is a bijection \(b:\mathbf {A} _m\longrightarrow \mathbf {A} _r\) in \(C\) with \(b(\mathbf {Q})\subseteq \mathbf {Q} \). By assumption, there is therefore a function \(e\) from \(\mathbf {A} _r\) to \(\bigcup \mathbf {A} _r\) with \(e(\mathbf {Q})\in \mathbf {Q} \subseteq b^{-1}(\mathbf {Q})\) such that \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for \(\{e(\mathbf {Q})\mathop {:}\mathbf {Q} \in \mathbf {A} _r\}\). Since \(\{e(\mathbf {Q})\mathop {:}\mathbf {Q} \in \mathbf {A} _r\}\) is epistemically possible given \(\mathbf {A} _r\), by Claim 3, \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is epistemically/approximately empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A} _r\). \(\square \)

Claim 8

\(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is at least as (restrictedly) epistemically empirically adequate as \(\langle \mathfrak {T} _s,\mathbf {E} _s\rangle \) for any (restricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances if and only if \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for all appearances \(\mathbf {A}\) for which \(\langle \mathfrak {T} _s,\mathbf {E} _s\rangle \) is empirically adequate.

Proof

\(\Rightarrow \)’: Choose the trivial (restricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances \(\langle \mathbf {A} \rangle \) with \(\mathbf {A}\) containing all appearances for which \(\langle \mathfrak {T} _s,\mathbf {E} _s\rangle \) is empirically adequate. Then all these appearances are epistemically possible appearances given \(\mathbf {A}\), and by Claim 3, the claim follows.

\(\Leftarrow \)’: Immediate from the definitions and Claim 3. \(\square \)

Claim 9

\(\langle \mathfrak {T} _s,\mathbf {E} _s\rangle \) is empirically adequate for all appearances \(\mathbf {A}\) for which \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate if and only if for every \(n\in N\), there is an \(s\in S\) such that all empirical substructures of \(\mathfrak {T} _n\) are isomorphic to empirical substructures of \(\mathfrak {T} _s\).

Proof

\(\Rightarrow \)’: For each \(\mathbf {E} _n\), choose \(\mathbf {A} =\mathbf {E} _n\). Then \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A}\), and thus \(\langle \mathfrak {T} _s,\mathbf {E} _s\rangle \) is empirically adequate for \(\mathbf {A}\). Therefore for every \(\mathfrak {E} \in \mathbf {E} _n=\mathbf {A} \) there is an \(s\in S\) and an \(\mathfrak {E} '\in \mathbf {E} _s\) such that \(\mathfrak {E} \cong \mathfrak {E} '\).

\(\Leftarrow \)’: Assume that for some \(\mathbf {A}\), \(\langle \mathfrak {T} _s,\mathbf {E} _s\rangle \) but not \(\bigl \langle \mathfrak {T} _n,\mathbf {E} _n\bigr \rangle \) is empirically adequate. Then there is an \(s\in S\) such that for all \(\mathfrak {A} \in \mathbf {A} \), there is an \(\mathfrak {E} '\in \mathbf {E} _s\) with \(\mathfrak {A} \cong \mathfrak {E} '\). Since there is no such \(n\in N\) and the isomorphism relation is transitive, there is no \(n\) such that for all \(\mathfrak {E} '\in \mathbf {E} _s\), there is an \(\mathfrak {E} \in \mathbf {E} _n\) with \(\mathfrak {E} '\cong \mathfrak {E} \). \(\square \)

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Lutz, S. Generalizing empirical adequacy I: multiplicity and approximation. Synthese 191, 3195–3225 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0440-3

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