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Notes
Names of concepts are written in small caps.
I also use these criteria to argue against hybrid theories of concepts, which hold that concepts have parts that store different kinds of information and that tend to be used in distinct processes.
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Machery, E. Précis of Doing without Concepts . Philos Stud 149, 401–410 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9527-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9527-y