Skip to main content
Log in

Objectivity, Interpretation, and Rights: A Critique of Dworkin

  • Published:
Law and Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

REFERENCES

  • Barry, Brian, Culture and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, Joshua, ‘The Arc of the Moral Universe’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 26(2) (1998): 91–134.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dancy, Jonathan, Moral Reasons (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Equality of Resources’, Sovereign Virtue (2000a): 65–119.

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Hard Cases’, Taking Rights Seriously (1977a): 81–130.

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘How Law is Like Literature’, A Matter of Principle (1985a): 146–166.

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?’ A Matter of Principle (1985b): 119–145.

  • Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Liberal Community’, Sovereign Virtue (2000b): 211–236.

  • Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It’, Philosophy and Public Affairs no. 2 (Spring, 1996): 87–139.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘On Interpretation and Objectivity’, A Matter of Principle (1985c): 167–177.

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Principle, Policy, Procedure’, A Matter of Principle (1985d): 73–103.

  • Dworkin, Ronald, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Taking Rights Seriously’, Taking Rights Seriously (1977b): 184–205.

  • Foot, Philipa, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

    Google Scholar 

  • Guest, Stephen, Ronald Dworkin (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, Jurgen, ‘Remarks on Legitimation Through Human Rights’, in Max Pensky (ed.), The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, Christine, Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie, John, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977).

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, John, ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in T. Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 110–129.

    Google Scholar 

  • Railton, Peter, ‘Moral Realism’, Philosophical Review XCV(2) (April 1986): 163–207.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

    Google Scholar 

  • Scanlon, Thomas, What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

    Google Scholar 

  • Warnke, Georgia, Justice and Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).

    Google Scholar 

  • Walzer, Michael, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Mahoney, J. Objectivity, Interpretation, and Rights: A Critique of Dworkin. Law and Philosophy 23, 187–222 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LAPH.0000011928.88986.ff

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LAPH.0000011928.88986.ff

Keywords

Navigation