Abstract
We separate the purely combinatorial component of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in the theory of collective preference from its decision-theoretic part, and likewise for the closely related result of Blair/Bordes/Kelly/Suzumura. Such a separation provides a particularly elegant proof of the former, via a new ‘splitting theorem’.
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Makinson, D. Combinatorial versus decision-theoretic components of impossibility theorems. Theor Decis 40, 181–189 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133172
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133172