Abstract
A close link between empathy and understanding has often been attributed to Dilthey, but in fact one seldom finds the German word for empathy—Einfühlung— in his writings. For this and other reasons one should be reluctant to reduce Dilthey’s theory of Verstehen to a form of empathy.1 The relation between Einfühlung and Verstehen is much more explicit in Husserl. By working out what this relation is for Husserl in Book Two of Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie and in some other late writings, we can see how phenomenology transformed the aesthetic meaning of Einfühlung, which had been originally established by the psychologist Theodor Lipps. In addition to distinguishing several senses of empathy, I will compare them to a range of related phenomena such as sympathy and pity, divination and transposition, appreciative understanding and critical understanding.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
See Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6, 123, 252f, 290, 329.
Theodor Lipps, “Empathy, Inner Imitation and Sense-Feelings,” trans. Max Schertel and Melvin Rader, in M. Rader, A Modern Book of Esthetics ( 5th ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1979 ), 376.
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie II, Husserliana IV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952 ), 163f.
Edith Stein, Zum Problem der Einfühlung ( Halle: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, 1917 ), 14.
See Stein, Zum Problem,p. 20.
See Stein, Zum Problem, p. 17. Einsfiihlung was actually endorsed by Max Scheler as a plausible intensification of Einfiihlung whereby the self is either totally, even hypnotically, swallowed up by the other, or vice versa where someone else is absorbed by me. See Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie ( 5th ed., Franlcfurt am Main: Verlag G. Schulte-Bulmke, 1948 ), 18.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1974 ), 269.
Adam Smith, The Themy of Moral Sentiments ( Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976 ), 51.
Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Life-Expressions,” in Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding,trans. Zaner and Heiges, intro. R. Makkreel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 133, revised.
Dilthey, Gesammelte Schrifen VII (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966 ), 214.
Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften V (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1957 ), 277.
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J. Payne ( New York: Dover, 1969 ), 178.
Schopenhauer, The World as Will,179.
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), 169. 15Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik,169–70.
Manfred Frank, in `Einleitung“ to Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik,47. ”See Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik,94.
See Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik,94.
See Franlc, Das individuelle Allgemeine.. Textstrukturierung und -interpretation nach Schleiermacher ( Franlcfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985 ), 315.
I am indebted to Gail Safer for referring me to these discussions. I would also like to thank David Carr, Lester Embree, Linda Fisher, James Hart, and Kathleen Haney for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Michael Theunissen, Der Andere ( Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1965 ), 72.
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (1931), trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973 ), 120.
Alvin Goldman, “Empathy, Mind and Morals,” in APA Proceedings,November 1992, 35.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment,trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner), §40, p. 136.
Because this paper was developed in response to Husserl’s phenomenology, I have presented a sequential account moving from empathy to sympathy to transposition. Thus empathy and appresentation proceeding from a single ego have assumed a kind of grounding status. From the hermeneutical perspective, however, a public or communal context is elementary without being foundational. It is thus best to consider these three ways of approaching understanding as three independent perspectives.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Makkreel, R.A. (1996). How is Empathy Related to Understanding?. In: Nenon, T., Embree, L. (eds) Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II . Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8628-3_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8628-3_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4746-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8628-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive