Abstract
Assignments of greater expected value to dominated options in Newcomb problems are analyzed as manifestations of reflective incoherence. The prospect of a greater reward by choosing a dominated option is illusory, since any ‘ill gotten’, i.e. irrational, gains can be leeched away by submitting the agent to a dynamic Dutch Book. In the Appendix, a proof is given which shows that if the agent is to avoid the Dutch Book in Newcomb situations, his degrees of belief are reflectively coherent if and only if his desirabilities at the time of choice align with his desirabilities at the time of action.
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Malinas, G. Reflective coherence and Newcomb problems: A simple solution. Theor Decis 35, 151–166 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01074956
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01074956