Abstract
What distinguishes a whole from an arbitrary sum of elements? I suggest a temporal and causal oriented approach. I defend two connected claims. The former is that existence is, by every means, coextensive with being the cause of a causal process. The latter is that a whole is the cause of a causal process with a joint effect. Thus, a whole is something that takes place in time. The approach endorses an unambiguous version of Restricted Composition that suits most commonsensical intuitions about wholes.
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Manzotti, R. No Time, No Wholes: A Temporal and Causal-Oriented Approach to the Ontology of Wholes. Axiomathes 19, 193–214 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-009-9067-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-009-9067-2