Abstract
ChickenHawk is a social-dilemma game that distinguishes uncoordinated from coordinated cooperation. In tests with players belonging to a culturally homogeneous population, natural-language “cheap talk” led to efficient coordination, while nonlinguistic signaling yielded uncoordinated altruism. In a subsequent test with players from a moderately more heterogeneous population nearby, the “cheap talk” condition still produced better coordination than other signaling conditions, but at a lower level and with fewer acts of altruism overall. Implications are: (1) without language, even willing cooperators coordinate poorly; (2) given a sufficiently homogeneous social group, language can coordinate cooperation in the face of opportunities for anonymous defection; (3) coordination therefore depends not on merely a general propensity to cooperate but on the overlap of social identities, which are always costly to acquire and maintain. So far as linguistic variation establishes how much social identities overlap, natural-language “cheap talk” is self-insuring, suggesting that linguistic variation is itself adaptive.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to my undergraduate research assistants, Jeffrey Barth and Carrie Robinson, for administering the classroom replications, and to Doug Jones, of the University of Utah, for alerting me to Baker’s work.
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Jeffreys, M. How can “cheap talk” yield coordination, given a conflict?. Mind & Society 7, 95–108 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-007-0042-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-007-0042-6