Abstract
This paper takes a fresh look at the nativism–empiricism debate, presenting and defending a nativist perspective on the mind. Empiricism is often taken to be the default view both in philosophy and in cognitive science. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there should be no presumption in favor of empiricism (or nativism), but that the existing evidence suggests that nativism is the most promising framework for the scientific study of the mind. Our case on behalf of nativism has four parts. (1) We characterize nativism’s core commitments relative to the contemporary debate between empiricists and nativists, (2) we present the positive case for nativism in terms of two central nativist arguments (the poverty of the stimulus argument and the argument from animals), (3) we respond to a number of influential objections to nativist theories, and (4) we explain the nativist approach to the conceptual system.
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Notes
See Cowie (1999) for an overview and analysis of the different objectives of historical and contemporary theorists. Among contemporary theorists, the psychological orientation also includes a debate about the relation between perception and cognition, where some self-described empiricists maintain that all mental representations are perceptual-motor representations. On this view, there is no such thing as fully abstract thought. See esp. Prinz (2002). Though Prinz’s empiricism is officially neutral about the status of innate concepts (pp. 195–196), it is clear that concerns about innateness are a motivating factor for proponents of his brand of empiricism.
Though our focus is on the contemporary dispute between empiricists and nativists, it’s worth noting that the disagreement about the structures and processes underlying development is also prominent in the historical philosophical dispute. For example, Hume epitomizes the empiricist strategy in invoking just a few domain-general principles of association, and Descartes the nativist strategy in invoking distinct systems for geometrical knowledge and language. For a valuable discussion of the psychological strand in historical nativist thinking and its relation to contemporary nativism, see Chomsky (2009).
For these reasons, it would be more accurate to refer to Empiricist Acquisition Bases (which are empiricist to varying degrees) and likewise Nativist Acquisition Bases (which are nativist to varying degrees).
Another way of stating this is to use the term Acquisition Base to refer neutrally to the set of psychological mechanisms, states, and processes that ultimately explain the acquisition of all traits that are acquired via psychological processes. (In saying that these mechanisms, states, and processes ultimately explain the acquisition of all psychological traits, we are highlighting the fact that these items and their components are not themselves acquired via psychological processes.) Given this general notion of an Acquisition Base, the dispute between nativists and empiricists turns on the character of the Acquisition Base.
This mistaken assumption is often expressed in terms of the slogan that learned and innate are opposites. But while it is certainly very plausible that if a psychological trait is learned it can’t be innate, it does not follow that learned traits are off limits for nativists. The reorientation that we are proposing (toward the character of the psychological systems involved in acquisition) opens the way for nativists to explain learning by appealing to distinctively nativist systems of acquisition, i.e., ones that appear in the Nativist Acquisition Base.
Carey uses this example to illustrate that it isn’t problematic to attribute domain-specific acquisition systems to animals. We wholeheartedly agree. See the argument from animals below.
Piaget’s views were based on observations of children failing tasks that involve searching and reaching, as when 6-month-olds cease trying to obtain an object once it is covered by a blanket (Piaget 1954). More recent work in developmental psychology questions the emphasis on manual search and relies instead on measures of infants’ attention. One technique is to use looking time to infer which of two events is the more expected. For a useful overview of how this method supports conclusions about the way that infants represent the physical world, see Baillargeon (2004).
Chomsky has always resisted the idea that evolutionary theory has anything useful to contribute to our understanding of the structure of the language faculty; see, e.g., Chomksy (1980). And Fodor is one of evolutionary psychology’s staunchest critics; see, e.g., Fodor (2000), the title of which is meant to indicate his negative reaction to Pinker (1997).
In these experiments, the monophagous feeders (vampire bats) weren’t directly compared to rats. They were compared to other species of bats, ones with varied diets. As a result, the adaptationist explanation made two substantive and correct predictions—that the vampire bats wouldn’t develop the taste aversion and that the other species of bat would.
Historically, a further reason why philosophers have had trouble recognizing the complexity of the mind is that they relied too heavily on introspection. While this is not the case for contemporary philosophers whose work is informed by the cognitive sciences, philosophers who are somewhat at a distance from the scientific study of the mind may not realize that there is no longer any serious scientific dispute about the enormous extent to which unconscious mental processes dominate mental life and consequently about the fact that introspection is often a poor guide to the mind’s working. See, e.g., Searle (1992). It is no coincidence that Searle is skeptical both about the unconscious and about standard nativist models of language acquisition.
It also isn’t about the ordinary use of the term innate. As theoretical frameworks regarding the study of the mind, nativism and empiricism are no more beholden to the everyday use of a term than any other scientific endeavor.
While empiricists may endorse some domain-specific acquisition systems, the dispute about the Acquisition Base remains. This is because they will generally suppose that such domain-specific systems are themselves acquired on the basis of more fundamental domain-general ones. See, e.g., Karmiloff-Smith’s treatment of acquired mental modules (Karmiloff-Smith 1992).
Notice as well that to the extent that nativism relies on the notion of innateness, so does empiricism. So it would be a major double standard to hold it against nativism that the notion of innateness is ill-defined, while simultaneously seeing this as an advantage of empiricism, as many empiricists seem to do.
Alternatively, Fodor’s view could be expressed in terms of the claim that such concepts are part of the Acquisition Base.
We’ve argued against Fodor’s radical concept nativism elsewhere; see Laurence and Margolis (2002). We should note that Fodor’s views on innate concepts have changed somewhat (see Fodor 2008). Nonetheless, Fodor continues to be skeptical of learning models, and his current biological approach to concept acquisition inherits many of the problems associated with his earlier view; see Margolis and Laurence (2011) for a critical assessment.
Although nativism shouldn’t be identified with the view that there are innate psychological traits, this doesn’t mean that nativists should be shy about postulating that some concepts are part of the Acquisition Base. The examples cited in the text are all ones where there is either ample empirical evidence, or persuasive theoretical considerations, in support of this claim.
Notice that what makes this a nativist model isn’t the supposition of a “religion module” or the claim that certain religious concepts are part of the Nativist Acquisition Base. The crucial point is simply that the acquisition of the concepts is substantially dependent on a Nativist Acquisition Base through the orchestration of a number of domain-specific cognitive systems in such an Acquisition Base.
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EM would like to thank Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies for supporting this research.
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This article was fully collaborative; the order of the authors’ names is arbitrary.
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Margolis, E., Laurence, S. In defense of nativism. Philos Stud 165, 693–718 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9972-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9972-x