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Kim On Reduction

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Abstract

In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3K7

    A. Marras

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Marras, A. Kim On Reduction. Erkenntnis 57, 231–257 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020932406567

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