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Trust, Testimony, and Prejudice in the Credibility Economy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Abstract

In this paper I argue for a special kind of injustice I call “trust injustice.” Taking Miranda Fricker's work on epistemic injustice as my starting point, I argue that there are some ethical constraints on trust relationships. If I am right about this, then we sometimes have duties to maintain trust relationships that are independent of the social roles we play.

Type
Epistemic Justice, Ignorance, and Procedural Objectivity
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by Hypatia, Inc.

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