Abstract
This paper defends Humeanism: the view that an agent has a reason for an intentional action if and only if it fulfills, or is a means to fulfilling, a current desire of that agent. Thomas Nagel presents an example involving a short-lived desire for eating a persimmon tomorrow. He claims that, contrary to Humeanism, this example is a clear case of irrationality. Furthermore, the Humean cannot simply dismiss all current desires with future objects, because desires of this sort are crucial to the Humean account of prudence. I respond that, correctly understood, Humeanism can simultaneously account for prudent conduct and other conduct motivated by present desires with future objects.
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Maslen, C. A Defense of Humeanism from Nagel's Persimmon. Erkenntnis 57, 41–46 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020190012498
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020190012498