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Notes
I will ignore the issue over whether something that is done without being done for a reason counts as action. Arpaly discusses the issue at pp. 131–138.
Arpaly, p. 37.
Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’ in Moral Luck (CUP, 1981). Williams’ account is the standard account.
In talking only of desires I am simplifying: Williams actually talks about the agent’s motivational set, where that can include “dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and ... commitments of the agent.” (p. 105).
Not that that is what Williams is trying to do.
Lawrence Bonjour, ‘‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5 (1980), pp. 53–73. I do not need to commit myself to the view that justifications of knowledge cannot be external my point here is just that a rational judgment must have an internal justification.
op. cit. p. 61.
Take ‘‘chicken sexing’’—imagine that chicken sexing is an innate talent and that the chicken sexer is unable to point to an independent justification the first time she does it. Her first chicken sex judgment does not seem rational—but after she has become convinced of her reliability, her judgments are rational.
As Bonjour points out, there is a tempting analogy with morality here: there is something odd about saying that an agent acted well just because her act turned out to be the morally best act, and of course there is a whole literature on the debate between objective and subjective versions of different moral theories. My point here is much more limited though—however we use the moral terms, we shouldn’t use the term rational to refer to cases where correctness is accidental from the agent’s point of view.
Arpaly, p. 37.
In his recent book, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, 2000, David Velleman argues that a desire and a belief can cause an action without that action having been done for a reason—as when I act on my unconscious desires. Velleman goes on to give an account of what it is to act for a reason. One difference between Velleman’s account and mine is that Velleman equates acting for a reason with acting autonomously—I want to leave that question open for the moment. Rather, I equate acting for a reason with acting rationally.
I am reluctant to say that one could be causally responsive to a reason—my inclination is to use the terminology in such a way that reasons and rationality are inter-defined—i.e. if one is responsive to a consideration qua reason, then one is rationally responsive, and if one is responsive causally then one is not responsive to a reason. The wind on my face might be a reason to turn away, e.g. to prevent the tears that would make my mascara run, but if I turn away because the wind blows me, then I am not responding to a reason.
I am not committed to any particular view about the meta question of whether the rules of rationality are ‘‘really there’’ in any sense. What I say here is compatible with a non-cognitivist view about rationality, such as Gibbard’s (Wise Choices Apt Feelings, Harvard University Press, 1990).
Arpaly, p. 36 (her italics).
I shall discuss only the examples relevant to Arpaly’s claim about rational akrasia—some of her examples are only relevant to her other points.
James Dreier and Geoffrey Sayre McCord.
Arpaly, p. 42.
Arpaly, p. 48.
Arpaly, p. 48.
Arpaly, p. 49.
Though I think it is unclear what ‘‘deliberation’’ is.
In fact it doesn’t matter to me whether Sam acts rationally or not—the point is that he doesn’t act akratically.
Arpaly, p. 50.
So, not akrasia cases.
“In possession” is the phrase Bonjour uses (e.g. p. 57).
Thanks to David McCarthy, Matt Nudds and Mike Ridge for discussion of these issues.
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Mason, E. Rationality and morality: thoughts on Unprincipled Virtue . Philos Stud 134, 441–448 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9070-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9070-z