Notes
Interestingly, Scanlon seems to endorse a similar thought when discussing “a person who is unable to see why the fact that his action would injure me should count against it”. As Scanlon puts it, such a person still holds that “this doesn’t count against it”. Thus, such a person is subject to moral criticism (is rightly held to be basically responsible in Gardner’s terms), but Scanlon insists that “it is a separate question” whether the agent should be held consequentially responsible (Scanlon 1998, pp. 288–290; for discussion, see Matravers 2003).
References
Dworkin, R. (2000). Sovereign virtue: The theory and practice of equality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Gardner, J. (2007). Offences and defences: Selected essays in the philosophy of criminal law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Matravers, M. (2003). Responsibility and choice. In M. Matravers (Ed.), Scanlon and contractualism. London: Frank Cass.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
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Matravers, M. John Gardner: Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law. Criminal Law, Philosophy 5, 231–235 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-011-9121-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-011-9121-1