Abstract
For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller’s criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance, for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to demonstrate that we need to bring about a revolution in science, and ultimately in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge.
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Notes
Elsewhere Muller has praised my work, for which I am very grateful to him: see Muller (2004).
This broader argument was first spelled out in Maxwell (1976). It was given a much more detailed and authoritative statement in Maxwell (1984), and was further developed in Maxwell (1998, 2001, 2004, 2007a). For lucid outlines of the argument see Maxwell (2000, 2007b, 2008). For a recent critical assessment see McHenry (2009). See also Muller (2004).
Maxwell (2002, p. 382).
There are so many that it would be wearisome to discuss all of them. I shall concentrate only on those that have a bearing on Muller’s main arguments.
He refers to my (1998, p. 37).
See my (1974, pp. 125–126), where I make clear that SE acknowledges that simplicity considerations govern choice of theory in science in addition to empirical considerations, and I refer to Mach, Duhem, Kuhn, Goodman, Scheffler and Rudner as having upheld such versions of SE.
Maxwell, (2002, pp. 383–385). This conclusion—that science “makes a big permanent assumption about the nature of the universe”—clashes with the central tenet of SE that “no thesis about the world [can be] upheld permanently as a part of knowledge independently of evidence, let alone in violation of evidence”.
Muller does get the conclusion of his argument right, even if almost everything else about the argument bears no resemblance to anything found in my writings. The conclusion of Muller’s “master” argument is “science permanently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe” which is, near enough, the conclusion of my argument refuting SE, given in summary form in Sect. 1 above.
“Aberrant” theories are theories that are grossly ad hoc or disunified; “regular” is Muller’s term for theories that are unified or non-ad hoc.
See, for example, my (1998, pp. 46–54 and 123–140).
SignSubst (13) explicates “important” or “influential”, I would have thought, rather than “substantial”, which I would have thought refers to the content of a proposition.
It may be doubted that this amounts to a definite proposition due to uncertainty as to what “ad hoc” or “aberrant” means in this context. One of the great triumphs of the conception of science that I argue for, aim-oriented empiricism, is that it solves the problem of what it means to say of a theory that it is “disunified”, “ad hoc” or “aberrant”: see Maxwell (1998, Chaps. 3 and 4). For more recent, and simpler expositions see Maxwell (2004, pp. 160–174; 2007a, pp. 373–386). What emerges from this solution is that there are eight different kinds of unity, and these come in degrees, 1, 2, 3, … This means that the proposition that the universe is such that no ad hoc or disunified theory is true is not just one proposition, but a whole range of propositions. Once my refutation of SE is accepted, the problem becomes to discover how to choose the best metaphysical proposition concerning unity from the wide range that are available. Aim-oriented empiricism is a meta-methodology designed specifically to facilitate that choice. It is essentially for this reason that aim-oriented empiricism needs to be accepted, granted that my refutation of SE is decisive.
Acc(9) is interpreted my Muller to take one “from observable behaviour to unobservable mental states”: see Muller (2008, p. 143). My refutation of SE, however, as I have already emphasized, does not touch upon unobservable mental states. It is about the explicit, public face of science, its theories, procedures of acceptance and rejection, methods, and their implications.
See, for example, Maxwell (2004), pp. 210–211.
See Maxwell (1998, pp. 211–212). van Fraassen, in linking acceptance to empirical adequacy, makes unrealistic demands that have not been met so far in practice as far as physical theory is concerned.
See works referred to in note 7.
The demand that the ad hoc theories in question are precise is here essential. Infinitely many imprecise grossly ad hoc theories are true even if the universe is perfectly physically comprehensible (in a sense of “physically comprehensible” I have explicated elsewhere: see Maxwell 1998, Chap. 5; 2004). I must add that condition (2) really needs to be put into the context of aim-oriented empiricism, for reasons I have indicated in note 16.
van Fraassen (1980, p. 88).
van Fraassen (1980, p. 89).
van Fraassen (1980, p. 90).
In deriving T* from the basic postulates of T, bridge statements identifying observable with unobservable states of affairs will also be required—of no help in the CE case.
This argument is spelled out in more detail in Maxwell (1993).
Muller (2008, p. 156, point C).
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Maxwell, N. Muller’s Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism. J Gen Philos Sci 40, 103–114 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9081-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9081-5