Abstract
Bogen and Woodward claim that the function of scientific theories is to account for 'phenomena', which they describe both as investigator-independent constituents of the world and as corresponding to patterns in data sets. I argue that, if phenomena are considered to correspond to patterns in data, it is inadmissible to regard them as investigator-independent entities. Bogen and Woodward's account of phenomena is thus incoherent. I offer an alternative account, according to which phenomena are investigator-relative entities. All the infinitely many patterns that data sets exhibit have equal intrinsic claim to the status of phenomenon: each investigator may stipulate which patterns correspond to phenomena for him or her. My notion of phenomena accords better both with experimental practice and with the historical development of science.
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REFERENCES
Bogen, J. and J. Woodward: 1988, 'Saving the Phenomena', Philosophical Review 97, 303-352.
Bogen, J. and J. Woodward: 1992, 'Observations, Theories and the Evolution of the Human Spirit', Philosophy of Science 59, 590-611.
Brown, J. R.: 1994, Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality, Routledge, London.
Woodward, J.: 1989, 'Data and Phenomena', Synthese 79, 393-472.
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McAllister, J.W. Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets. Erkenntnis 47, 217–228 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005387021520
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005387021520