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Rational Choice and Moral Theory

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Abstract

Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as a continuation of this older tradition. I then go on to argue for a controversial three-fold thesis: (1) that grounding a theory of morality in terms of rational self-interest is the only epistemologically respectable way to proceed with the justification of moral principles; (2) that despite this, most of the contemporary explorations of rational choice foundations for moral principles do not work—that the models of rational choice to which they appeal yield less than the substantial results that they are intended to yield; but (3) that if one rethinks just what it means to be rational, one can find in fact a promising way to connect the two—specifically through the development of a theory of genuinely cooperative activity.

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Notes

  1. There are, of course, substantial interpretive issues regarding the viewpoints expressed in the Protagoras, but Glaucon’s argument in the Republic is quite clear, and so I will focus upon it.

  2. This is a very early version of what has come to be known as the “free rider” problem.

  3. R. M. Hare (1996) refers to this as the Cartesian approach to justification.

  4. See Aquinas (1271–72 [1945]: Question 94).

  5. See, for example, Bentham (1789 [1988]: Ch. 1) and Mill (1861 [1998]: Ch. IV). They offer essentially a priori arguments for the fundamental utilitarian principle itself.

  6. See, for example, Prichard (1912).

  7. Hobbes (1651 [1994]: Chapters XIV-XV).

  8. Locke (1689–91 [1975]: 67).

  9. It is a distinguishing mark of ‘modern’ philosophy that it envisions a special epistemological problem about the justification of normative (as distinct from descriptive or indicative) judgments; what marks post-modernism is the collapse of this distinction, as expressed in an insistence on the problematic nature of all claims, descriptive no less than normative.

  10. See Locke (1689–91 [1975]: 67).

  11. To be sure, he suggests, there are certain “normative” propositions that are self-evident. But this is simply because they are analytic, and thus, in modern parlance, have no content (e.g., ‘What is wrong ought not to be done.’).

  12. See Hume (1739–40 [1960]: 469–70).

  13. Ayer (1936 [1952]); Stevenson (1944).

  14. Rawls (1971 [1999]: 507).

  15. See, in particular, the way the reflective equilibrium argument is first developed in Rawls (1950).

  16. Baier (1963).

  17. This is a shift that is proposed as early as Hampshire (1949).

  18. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953).

  19. The recasting of the argument in terms of something other than just self-regarding interests is explicitly a feature of the very important and non-technical approach taken by Strawson (1961). He argues that one can defend a minimal social morality by the idea that it would further the pursuit of each persons own ideals.

  20. Rawls (1971 [1999]); Harsanyi (1977).

  21. Harsanyi (1955), Sen (1977), and Arrow (1977).

  22. Margolis (1984); Fehr and Schmidt (1999).

  23. Nash (1950, 1953); Gauthier (1986).

  24. See Luce and Raiffa (1957: Ch. 13).

  25. Hobbes supposes that the “free-rider” problem can be resolved by the presence of the Leviathan.

  26. Nash (1950).

  27. Nash (1953).

  28. Harsanyi (1956). Harsanyi (1963) also showed how the theory could be extended to cover the case of n-person bargaining, in which a given player’s payoff could be represented as an additive sum of what that player could achieve in each of the two-person games that he or she could be presumed to play with the other n-1 players.

  29. One has to be struck with the image that this theory projects. It presumes a situation that is not altogether different than what occurs in the much-discussed non-cooperative game of “chicken”, in which the confrontation is settled by determining who must “blink” first!

  30. See, for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957: Ch. 6.5)

  31. The importance of everyone benefiting is closely related to the emphasis that Buchanan and Tullock place on unanimity. See Buchanan and Tullock (1962: Ch. 7).

  32. See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: Ch. 5). It must also be noted, however, that one of the important limitations of the folk-theorems is that retaliatory strategies will not work if the players discount the future “too much”.

  33. See, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 4.3.1).

  34. See, for example, Kreps (1990).

  35. More specifically, this will only occur when threat and bargaining power are precisely matched among the parties involved.

  36. To be sure, it could be argued that the work of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggests a way in which to cope with this last problem—the problem of resentment. These authors suppose that participants in bargaining will resent it if non-reciprocal terms are forced upon them, and that this will lead, as I have suggested, to suboptimal outcomes. But this way of coping amounts to abandoning the Nash-Harsanyi model. Bargaining must now be seen to involve more than just relative threat and bargaining power. Moreover, as presented by Fehr and others, one must, it would seem appeal to what one would ordinarily regard as a moral emotion, and hence that its presence in an account of bargaining means the presence of a “non-rational” factor in successful bargaining. This is very puzzling, since the significance such “moral” emotions, as they see it, is that they make possible an outcome that meets the Pareto-Optimality condition.

  37. This is primarily due to the work of Roth. See, in particular, Roth (1977).

  38. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953: 11).

  39. Kaysen (1946-7).

  40. For the development of this argument, see Luce and Raiffa (1957: Ch 4.4). The argument there is introduced in the discussion of strictly competitive (zero-sum) games. Moreover, in that context, a solution meets the Von Neumann and Morgenstern solution if and only if it is also an equilibrium solution. However, when they move to the discussion, in Chapter 5, of games that are not strictly competitive, where the solution concepts diverge, they continue to suppose that the rational solution has to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

  41. I am referring here to what can be characterized as the popular or less formal conception of autism. In recent work that concept has been considerably refined and modified. Note also that this is not a criticism that can be leveled against Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s own theory, since it makes no use of the concept of maximizing against what one expects the other player(s) to do, nor of the concept of an equilibrium. Their theory of the two-person zero-sum game focuses on the problem of protecting oneself against a damaging move by the other player.

  42. I am assuming, that is, that rational players are, following Gauthier, conditional cooperators: they will be willing to cooperate only with those who they believe are also willing to cooperate with them. See Gauthier (1986: Ch. VI), and the next Section.

  43. Gauthier (1986: 129).

  44. Gauthier (1986: Ch. VII).

  45. The importance of everyone benefitting is closely related to the emphasis that Buchanan and Tullock (1962: Ch. 7) place on unanimity.

  46. To show that only such pragmatic considerations could justify inequalities in the benefits generated by cooperation would call, of course, for a much more extensive discussion than I can offer here in an article length discussion. Here, I shall just suggest that an appeal to intuition in defense of an unequal distribution may satisfy some, but others will likely appeal to a different intuition. A pragmatic argument avoids the clash of intuitions that typically results: it has the great virtue of offering each and every participant a reason for the inequality.

  47. Other measures include the Atkinson Measure, the Theil Index (a measure of entropy) and the Hoover Index. For a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of various ways to measure inequality see Sen (1973 [1997]).

  48. Recall that I am using Strict Pareto improvement as the appropriate criterion here. See Section 4 above.

  49. Rawls 1971 [1999]: 6.

  50. Rawls (1958).

  51. See Rawls (1971 [1999]: 72). The second principle is also there given a lexicographical formulation. Rawls claims that the ‘difference’ formulation can be derived from the original formulation by appealing to two special assumptions of ‘chain-connectedness’ and ‘close-knitness’. See Rawls (1971 [1999]: 69–71). But if these assumptions do not hold, then he argues (inexplicably!) that one is to use the ‘difference principle’ formulation. See Rawls (1971 [1999]: 70–71). My argument favors returning to the original formulation in terms of requiring departures from equalities to work to the advantage of all. There also remains here the important issue of whether any of these principles are to be formulated in terms of “utilities” (as a measure of welfare) or expected primary goods (income, social position, etc.). Following both Rawls (1971 [1999]: 78–81) and Dworkin (1981), I have retained the idea of making no appeal to “utilities”. To formulate the relevant principle in terms of “utilities” poses the intractable problem of making sense of interpersonal comparisons of utilities.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse, NY, 13244-1170, USA

    Edward F. McClennen

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McClennen, E.F. Rational Choice and Moral Theory. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 13, 521–540 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9253-8

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