Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy

Book Reviews 435 On Pragmatism Cornells de Waal Belmost, CA: CA Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005 198 pp. This short book is an introduction to pragmatism that covers many of the major figures. De Waal organized the chapters in an approximate historical sequence, from Peirce on to such present-day pragmatists as Rorty and Haack. The book has the virtue of covering some European pragmatists who, if they are mentioned at all in other histories, are almost never discussed in detail. De Waal devotes a chapter to F.C.S Schiller, and also one to the Italian pragmatists who flourished at the beginning of the twentieth century: Papini, Vailati, Prezzolini, and Calderoni. I have never encountered any good treatment of these figures and de Waal not only provides a background account of their work but also discusses their relation to Peirce and James. The books begins with an account of the early Peirce, especially a detailed look at his theory of meaning, which was the tenuous beginning of the pragmatist movement. In a later chapter de Waal examines Peirce's "normative turn". He thereby stresses the differences between the early and late Peirce. He also brings out the differences between Peirce's theory of meaning and James's novel application of Peirce to the theory of truth. This contrast provides a running theme and a schema for classifying subsequent figures as primarily Peircean or Jamesian. The stress on meaning and truth in the first chapters sets the stage for later themes and the book as a whole concentrates on epistemological topics and to a lesser extent, logic. Epistemology, of course, was what united the many varieties of pragmatism, as Schiller remarked. However, the many metaphysical differences between the pragmatists and those whom they influenced to some degree, from Royce's "absolute" idealistic pragmatism to Santayana's materialism, are not covered in any detail. De Waal examines James's "Will to Believe" much more than his "Radical Empiricism" and "Pluralistic Universe." Again, the vitalistic theory of value that the pragmatists subscribed to, influenced as they were by Darwin, is never mentioned. De Waal remarks in the Preface that considerations of space meant that he had to make "painful choices" about which figures to include. In the fine chapter on F.C.S. Schiller, whose work and influence tends to be ignored in modern pragmatism, Schiller's pragmatic humanism and the differences between humanism and pragmatism are explained, as well as Schiller's contributions to the pragmatic theory of truth. My only comment here is that some contrast might have been made between Schiller's humanism and both earlier and later forms of humanism. For example, the Renaissance humanism of Pico della Mirándola and Erasmus elevates humans but places Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Spring, 2005, Vol. XLI, No. 2 436 Book Reviews them within the Medieval supernatural framework. In more recent times there is the "naturalistic" humanism of such figures as Sidney Hook, and the existential humanism of Sartre and Camus. Schiller's pragmatic humanism differs from all these figures. But I sympathize with de Waal's attempt to make a valuable contribution in a small space. De Waal presents the internal dialogue in the Italian movement as a difference between those who followed Peirce's stricter, more science oriented vision (Vailati and Calderoni) and those more influenced by James's and Schiller's looser or, as he calls it, "wild" pragmatism (Papini and Prezzolini). As he notes, this movement was short-lived, left no legacy and had few followers in Italy. The next chapter on Peirce's "normative turn," argues for a transition in Peirce from the "nominalism" of his early period to his adaptation of Scholastic realism in his later years, under the influence particularly of Duns Scotus. De Waal correctly notes that Peirce also reformulated his idea of the "normative sciences," in which he included logic, during these years. For Peirce, the normative sciences of logic, ethics and esthetics are concerned with different values. What Schiller and Peirce did not notice is the degree to which Peirce was moving toward Schiller with this "normative turn." Schiller placed human values as the basis for all of philosophy in...