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Truth and Assertability

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Abstract

Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability; but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way.

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References

  1. Gupta, A. (1993). A critique of deflationism. Philosophical Topics, 21, 57–81.

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  2. Horwich, P. (1998). Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia

    Michael McDermott

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  1. Michael McDermott
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Correspondence to Michael McDermott.

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McDermott, M. Truth and Assertability. J Philos Logic 38, 465–470 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9103-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9103-0

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