Abstract
I argue that the strongest form of consequentialism is one which rejects the claim that we are morally obliged to bring about the best available consequences, but which continues to assert that what there is most reason to do is bring about the best available consequences. Such an approach promises to avoid common objections to consequentialism, such as demandingness objections. Nevertheless, the onus is on the defender of this approach either to offer her own account of what moral obligations we do face, or to explain why offering such a theory is ill-advised. I consider, and reject, one attempt at the second sort of strategy, put forward by Alastair Norcross, who defends a ‘scalar’ consequentialism which eschews the moral concepts of right, wrong and obligation, and limits itself to claims about what is better and worse. I go on to raise some considerations which suggest that no systematic consequentialist theory of our moral obligations will be plausible, and propose instead that consequentialism should have a more informal and indirect role in shaping what we take our moral obligations to be.
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Notes
My own favoured form of consequentialism is, like utilitarianism, a welfare-based one, but not much of what I say here depends on a particular account of the good. But I do take it that any plausible form of consequentialism will have well-being or happiness as one principal constituent of the good.
Mill (1961–91, Vol. X, p. 337). More famously, in Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, Mill says, ‘We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency.’ Mill (1998), Chapter 5, Paragraph 14. Roger Crisp draws a similar distinction to the one I draw between MC and GC′. He distinguishes ‘Moral Utilitarianism’ (the view that it is wrong not to maximise utility) and ‘Normative Utilitarianism’ (the view that any agent has ultimate reason only to maximize utility). Crisp (2006, pp. 25–26).
Norcross (2006, p. 217).
Norcross (2006, p. 228).
Norcross (2006, p. 225).
Norcross (2006, p. 225).
Norcross (2006), 226.
Some philosophers have been driven by worries about the possibility of free will to adopt a blanket skepticism about blameworthiness. Needless to say, combating this sort of error theory is beyond the scope of this paper. I assume here that many of our everyday judgements of blameworthiness are in good order.
Hooker (2000, p. 159).
Murphy (1997).
As Mill says, ‘That a feeling is bestowed on us by Nature, does not necessarily legitimate all its promptings.’ Mill (1998, Chapter 5, Paragraph 2).
Considerations of consistency can certainly take us some distance in revising our moral judgements. We can say, ‘You judge that A merits blame, but that B does not. But what is the relevant difference between A and B?’ If we can cite no difference that strikes us as relevant, we face strong pressure to revise one or other judgement.
Mulgan (2001, Chapter 6).
For a development of this idea and for details of further problems facing a hybrid theory with a single variable, see Mulgan (2001, Chapter 6).
Fishkin (1982).
Mulgan (2001, p. 166).
Crisp (2006, p. 25).
See McElwee (forthcoming).
Furthermore, it is very difficult for someone, individually, to take these issues really seriously, on a consistent basis, given that those around her are not. If we all recognise a norm to do more for the distant poor or to preserve the environment, it becomes easier for each to make sacrifices, when those around us are also making sacrifices, and expect it of us. As things stand, it is often the case that others even expect us (in a non-normative sense) not to contribute seriously to aiding the distant poor and preserving the environment.
This approach to the cultivation of the moral sentiments in a direction more conducive to good consequences may be similarly attractive for other, non-moral sentiments. If feeling grief or pity or amusement towards a particular sort of object generally has bad consequences, then consequentialism can recommend that we should attempt gradually to change our sentiments, to learn to feel differently.
Mill (1961–91, Vol. X, p. 338).
Consequentialism may be a plausible theory of the value of other things beside acts: e.g. the best political arrangement may be the one which produces the best consequences, the best lifestyle is the one which produces the best consequences, the best character traits to have are those which have the best consequences, etc.
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Acknowledgements
For very helpful discussion of the issues addressed in this paper, I am grateful to Roger Crisp, Brad Hooker, Kent Hurtig, Gerald Lang, Rob Lawlor, Tim Mulgan, Jonas Olson, Simon Robertson, Raffaele Rodogno and John Skorupski, and to an audience at the Moral Philosophy Seminar at the University of Oxford, where an early draft was presented.
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McElwee, B. The rights and wrongs of consequentialism. Philos Stud 151, 393–412 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9458-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9458-7