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Can Substitution Inferences Explain the Knobe Effect?

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Abstract

The Knobe effect is the phenomenon demonstrated in the course of repeated studies showing that moral valence affects the way in which we apply concepts. Knobe explains the effect by appealing to the nature of the concepts themselves: whether they actually apply in some situation depends upon the moral valence of some element of that situation. In this paper, a different picture of the effect is presented and given motivation. It is suggested that subjects apply concepts on the basis of substitution inferences. It is attempted to show that this picture is incompatible with, but preferable to, Knobe’s theory. In closing, some further observations and suggestions are given with respect to further research into the apparent effect of moral valence.

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Notes

  1. “Each subject rated both statements on a scale from −3 (‘not at all’) to +3 (‘fully’), with the 0 point marked ‘somewhat.’ The mean rating for the statement that the professor caused the problem was 2.2; the mean for the statement that the assistant caused the problem was −1.2.” (Ibid: 4)

  2. I assume for the sake of exposition that there is one, uniform inference made by all subjects responding to the vignettes. It appears that this may not be the case, as Cokely and Feltz (2009) suggest.

  3. This is an empirical claim, but not one I thought worth investigating.

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Acknowledgements

The following gave helpful comments on earlier drafts and presentations of this material: Shane Babcock, James Beebe, Wesley Buckwalter, Peter Carruthers, Roberto Casati, Theodore Everett, Michael Gifford, Michael Hunter, Benjamin Kozuch, Michael Levin, Hilary Martin, Patrick Ray, Thomas Reynolds, Travis Rodgers, David Sackris, and audiences at SUNY Buffalo, Texas Tech University, CUNY Graduate Center, York University and two anonymous referees.

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    Corey McGrath

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McGrath, C. Can Substitution Inferences Explain the Knobe Effect?. Rev.Phil.Psych. 2, 667–679 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0061-4

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