Skip to main content
Log in

Reductive levels and multi-scale structure

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be revised.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Baker, L. R. (1993). Metaphysics and mental causation. In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation. Oxford: Clarendon.

  • Batterman R.W. (1995). Theories between theories. Synthese 103, 171–201

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block N. (1997). Anti-reductionism slaps back. Philosophical Perspectives 11, 107–132

    Google Scholar 

  • Block N. (2003). Do causal powers drain away?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67, 133–150

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1993). Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation. Oxford: Clarendon.

  • Cartwright N. (1980). Do the laws of physics state the facts?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61, 75–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Cartwright N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford, Claredon Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Creary L. (1981). Causal explanation and the reality of natural component forces. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62, 148–157

    Google Scholar 

  • Dehmelt H. (1989). Triton,...electron...cosmon,...:An infinite regression?. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 86, 8618–8619

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Edwards D.A. (2000). An alternative example of the method of multiple scales. SIAM Review 42, 317–332

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hinch E.J. (1990). Perturbation methods. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmes M. (1999). The method of multiple scales. Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics 56, 23–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Hornung U. (1997). Homogenization and porous media. New York, Springer

    Google Scholar 

  • Kevorkian J., Cole J.D. (1996). Multiple scale and singular perturbation methods. New York, Springer

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim J. (1998). Mind in a physical world. Boston, MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim J. (1999). Supervenient properties and micro-based properties: A reply to Noordhof. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, 115–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim J. (2002). The layered model: Metaphysical considerations. Philosophical Explorations 5, 2–20

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim J. (2003). Blocking causal drainage and other maintenance chores with mental causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67, 151–176

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim J. (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Lange M. (1994). Scientific realism and components: The case of classical astronomy. The Monist 77, 111–127

    Google Scholar 

  • Liston M. (1993). Taking mathematical fictions seriously. Synthese 95, 433–458

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Majda A., Klein R. (2003). Systematic multi-scale models for the tropics. Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 60, 357–372

    Google Scholar 

  • McMullin E. (1978). Structural explanation. American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 139–147

    Google Scholar 

  • Merricks T. (1995). Review of Supervenience and Mind. Philosophical Books 36, 156–164

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nayfeh A. (1973). Perturbation methods. New York, Wiley

    Google Scholar 

  • Nickles T. (1973). Two concepts of intertheoretic reduction. The Journal of Philosophy 70, 181–201

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noordhof P. (1999). Micro-based properties and the supervenience argument: A response to Kim. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, 109–114

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oppenheim, P., & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota studies in the Philosophy of science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Rueger A. (2004). Reduction, autonomy, and causal exclusion among physical properties. Synthese 139, 1–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scerri, E. (1994). Has chemistry been at least approximately reduced to quantum mechanics? In: Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association (Vol. 1, pp. 160–170).

  • Sheldon N.A. (1985). One wave or three? A problem for realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36, 431–436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sturgeon S. (1998). Physicalism and overdetermination. Mind 107, 411–432

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Teller P. (1995). An interpretive introduction to quantum field theory. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Dyke M. (1975). Perturbation methods in fluid mechanics, Stanford, California, The Parabolic Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Gulick R. (1992). Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36, 311–332

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Volland H. (1988). Atmospheric tidal and planetary waves. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers

    Google Scholar 

  • Yablo S. (1992). Cause and essence. Synthese 93, 403–449

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Patrick McGivern.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

McGivern, P. Reductive levels and multi-scale structure. Synthese 165, 53–75 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9232-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9232-3

Keywords

Navigation