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Husserl and the representational theory of mind

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Abstract

Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality — the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.

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My thanks to David Woodruff Smith and Frank McGuinness for their invaluable help with the issues addressed in this paper.

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McIntyre, R. Husserl and the representational theory of mind. Topoi 5, 101–113 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139224

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