Abstract
In everyday life people frequently recognize that a person at a time may be more or less strongly motivated to carry out an intentional action and that “trying harder” frequently affects the successful completion of an intentional action. In “Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence,” John Pollock provides an original account of rational choice in which “trying to do an action” is a basic factor. This paper argues that Pollock’s “expected-utility optimality prescription” is deficient because it lacks a parameter for intensity of trying. The paper also indicates specific ways in which this deficiency could be corrected.
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Mcinerney, P.K. Pollock on Rational Choice and Trying. Philos Stud 129, 253–261 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7830-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7830-1