Abstract
The question of what makes a belief about an object has received concurring answers from two important philosophers. David Lewis [1979] and Roderick Chisholm [1981] have presented several related analyses of de re belief, arguing that de se belief (belief about the self) is the fundamental notion in terms of which de re belief can and must be analyzed.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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McKay, T.J. (1988). De Re and De Se Belief. In: Austin, D.F. (eds) Philosophical Analysis. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3150-2
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