Abstract
Charles Peirce, the founder of pragmatism and himself a working scientist, was concerned to formulate elements of his pragmatism so as to be of practical benefit to philosophers and scientists alike. This discussion investigates the practical recommendations of Peircean pragmatism, especially as it relates to questions of how we should conduct scientific inquiry. Peirce’s model of inquiry is supposed to demarcate appropriate from specious methods of inquiry. While, as Cheryl Misak points out, Peirce’s explicit account fails, the account can nevertheless be rescued by elements of his own system. Specifically the account provided in this paper draws from Peirce’s corollary to his “first rule of reason,” that one should not block the road to inquiry. Following this corollary, under the guidance of Peirce’s view of reality and the role it plays in inquiry, leads us to conclude that the optimal way to conduct inquiry is to follow the path of greatest resistance. We cannot, however, as Peirce recognized, pursue our researches optimally, since we are limited in time, energy, and other resources. Making the best use of those resources requires a measure of economy. To this end, Peirce developed specific recommendations about the economy of research. The focus here is on his recommendation regarding hypothesis testing, which is that we “begin with that positive prediction . . . which seems least likely to be verified.” According to this suggestion, to test any given hypothesis we should begin by assessing the probability of each of its predictions, given a suitable, contrary hypothesis. Once we note which are the least likely of the predictions, we use other economic factors to determine which tests to perform. The fortified Peircean account developed here maintains that inquiry should be conducted so as to leave open the path to future inquiry. This means taking a particular attitude toward our set of beliefs—being prepared to recognize their limitations and keeping the field of belief susceptible to doubt. In accepting that inquiry is best that serves to maximize resistance, we require of ourselves a constant striving, believing just what we believe, but never resting content with it. This is the attitude of the consummate scientist, accepting the best of the theories available, but never dogmatically, and always on alert for opportunities to recognize the shortcomings of those views and awake to the possibility that other, better theories are on the horizon.
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Notes
This is to be explored more deeply in what follows, especially with respect to the precise sort of relationship that exists between belief and doubt.
See also 5.374–5.
This discussion leaves aside the question of from where beliefs come initially—though a thorough study of Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology would go some way to illuminating Peirce’s stance on this issue. For such a study, see (Kronz and McLaughlin 2002). Peirce himself took up this issue, though his treatment has not thoroughly satisfied his critics. See, for example, (Scheffler 1974, 66–67). It is enough for the present purposes that we incontrovertibly do have beliefs and that they may be consistently treated in the way that Peirce treats them. The issue of whether Peirce’s account of belief origination could be made satisfactory is left for future exploration.
For a full description of these methods, and his argument against each of them, see Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief” (5.358–387). Peirce offers something of a revised treatment of methods of inquiry in his “The Logic of 1873” (7.313–361). The discussion there is not substantively different from what appears in “The Fixation of Belief” concerning what makes a method of inquiry legitimate or specious.
This is, of course, only a very cursory treatment of Peirce’s arguments against specious methods of inquiry, which for present purposes suffices. Much has been written on this subject, and I refer the interested reader to other sources for more detailed treatments of Peirce’s theory of inquiry; see (Hookway 2000); (Levi 1991); (Misak 1991); (Short 2000); (Skagestad 1981).
In his “The Logic of 1873” Peirce refers to this method as “investigation” and “reasoning.”
See, for example, 2.693, 5.408, 8.43, more obliquely 4.62 and 7.336. The reasonableness of this account of truth is not discussed here; the account is mentioned only to showcase the role that inquiry plays in Peirce’s system.
See also 7.644.
See also 1.156, 1.170, 1.175, 6.273, 8.243. How this maxim follows from fallibilism is not explored here. The relationship between Peirce’s fallibilism and other of his epistemological commitments, though, is taken up again in a later section.
See 5.373–375, 5.394, 7.317.
For further information about Peirce’s conception of a dynamical object and its role in the broader semiotics, see: 8.183, 8.343–344.
The discussion in the remainder of this paragraph relies significantly on Olshewsky (1994).
See, for example, 8.153.
Peirce makes some recommendations for how hypothesis testing should proceed, based on considerations of economy. Peirce’s work on the economy of research is explored below.
Deborah Mayo agrees that the severity of the tests a hypothesis passes is indicative of the degree to which the hypothesis is to be believed. She also characterizes Peirce’s view of induction in similar terms. For her characterization, see section 12.2 of (Mayo 1996). Notice, though that a discussion of Peirce on inductive procedure is much more restricted than what is undertaken here. The account developed here is an account of Peirce’s theory of inquiry broadly understood, and supplemented by other epistemological considerations.
See chapter 4 of (Rescher 1978).
(Rescher 1978, 69, n105, n108); (Kronz and McLaughlin 2005, 74). The reference to the strength of a hypothesis here means the strength of the hypothesis as a candidate for experimental testing. This is different from conceiving of the strength of the hypothesis in terms of its support. The difference is clearest when one notes that a hypothesis that has strong support (a lot of evidence amassed in its favor) is not likely to have much experimental ‘urgency’ since it is already well corroborated and so devoting resources to testing it would likely be wasteful. Peirce notes that there is a law of diminishing returns when it comes to further testing of hypotheses whose practical implications have been borne out by experimental results. See, e.g., 7.144.
Peirce writes that “it will be a saving of expense, to begin with that positive prediction from the hypothesis which seems least likely to be verified.” While this sentence, as is, suggests that it is the hypothesis “least likely to be verified” with which one should begin, the rest of the paragraph makes clear that Peirce means the prediction, not the hypothesis. The full paragraph, without elision, follows:
Experiment is very expensive business, in money, in time, and in thought; so that it will be a saving of expense, to begin with that positive prediction from the hypothesis which seems least likely to be verified. For a single experiment may absolutely refute the most valuable of hypotheses, while a hypothesis must be a trifling one indeed if a single experiment could establish it. When, however, we find that prediction after prediction, notwithstanding a preference for putting the most unlikely ones to the test, is verified by experiment, whether without modification or with a merely quantitative modification, we begin to accord to the hypothesis a standing among scientific results. (7.206)
Note that in this case, as well as the general case, h′ entails ~h, but the converse does not hold.
The significant passage referred to in (Kronz and McLaughlin 2005) appears at 5.196. Others, both before and after Peirce, have made similar suggestions. Paul Feyerabend argues that consideration of contrary hypotheses is necessary for understanding a hypothesis (Feyerabend 1981). John Stuart Mill makes a similar suggestion in On Liberty.
As noted previously, Kronz and McLaughlin formulate this recommendation in formal terms. What appears here is an informal rendering.
Many will recognize here some affinity with recommendations by Karl Popper. Popper’s falsificationism might be a way to capture the “pursuit of resistance” view advocated here. It is interesting to note that there are many similarities between Peirce’s and Popper’s accounts, down to their common use of the metaphor of a bog as the grounding of science. Peirce writes: “[Science] is not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way” (5.589). Popper, on page 111 of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, writes:
Science does not rest upon a solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (1980)
A thorough comparison between the two on this and other issues is, of course, far beyond the scope of the current project.
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McLaughlin, A. In pursuit of resistance: pragmatic recommendations for doing science within one’s means. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 1, 353 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0030-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0030-x