Abstract
Certain types of corporate charter antitakeover amendments, or “shark repellents,” may not serve the interests of the stockholders or the stakeholders of the firm. This paper extends the examination of the use of shark repellents by taking an ethical perspective to synthesize prior research on shark repellents and their relationship to stockholder and stakeholder welfare. Some shark repellents seem to benefit certain interest groups at the expense of other groups.
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Nancy L. Meade is an assistant professor of Accounting at the University of Louisville.
Dan Davidson is a professor of Business Law at Radford University.
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Meade, N.L., Davidson, D. The use of “shark repellents” to prevent corporate takeovers: An ethical perspective. J Bus Ethics 12, 83–92 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00871928
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00871928