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What’s So Special about Self-Knowledge?

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Correspondence to Jose Medina.

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Medina, J. What’s So Special about Self-Knowledge?. Philos Stud 129, 575–603 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-3616-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-3616-8

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