Biological explanations and social responsibility

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show that critics of biological explanations of human nature may be granting too much to those who propose such explanations when they argue that the truth of genetic determinism implies an end to critical evaluation and reform of our social institutions. This is the case because when we argue that biological determinism exempts us from social critique we are erroneously presupposing that our social values, practices, and institutions have nothing to do with what makes biological explanations troublesome. My argument is that what constitutes a problem for those who are concerned with social justice is not the fact that particular behaviours may be genetically determined, but the fact that our value system and social institutions create the conditions that make such behaviours problematic. Thus, I will argue that even if genetic determinism were correct, the requirement of assessing and transforming our social practices and institutions would be far from superfluous. Biology is rarely destiny for human beings and the institutions they create.

Introduction

Biological explanations seem to have a wondrous appeal for human beings. We have only to look at the history of science to observe this. From Aristotle to Galton to our present day evolutionary psychologists and genetic behaviourists, biological explanations—even if in different forms—seem to be the obvious answer to our quest for understanding human similarities and differences. The Human Genome Project has only increased our expectations for these kinds of answers. Although we once thought that our fate was in the stars, now we seem to believe that our destiny is in our genes.

The appeal of biological explanations of human nature is often counteracted by the shadow of, for example, unjust public policies promoted by social Darwinists and the eugenic experiments performed by the Nazis (see Paul, 1998, Kevles, 1995). Thus, those who now insist on the importance and the need for biological explanations to solve the problems that loom ahead—from genetic diseases to social unrest—feel obliged to maintain that their scientific explanations are far from the ideological ones offered by social Darwinists and eugenicists (see Wright, 1994, pp. 7–8). They claim, for example, that genetics in itself is never evil. It is its use or misuse that constitutes a problem. Certainly everybody would agree, they say, that to find ways to ameliorate the impact of mental illness is inherently good, while the killing of German mental patients by the Nazis was the worst of barbarism (Watson, 2000, pp. 169–208). Furthermore, they argue that if we want our public policies to solve problems such as criminal behaviour, alcoholism, learning disabilities, schizophrenia, or war, we ought to pay attention to the evolutionary history of humankind. Failing to do so is a recipe for disaster (Cartwright, 2000, Thornhill and Palmer, 2000, Daly and Wilson, 1996, Buss, 1996, Wright, 1994).

Critics of biological explanations of human nature insist that many of these explanations presuppose (despite the disclaimers continually made by supporters) an unsustainable biological determinism (see Rose, 2001, Benton, 2000, Lewontin, 2000, Oyama, 2000, Shakespeare and Erickson, 2000, Rose, 2000, Bleier, 1985, Kitcher, 1985, Gould, 1981). They maintain that biological explanations of human behaviour or human disease are reductionist; that genes can only be understood as contributing causes; that organisms are in constant interaction with their environment in complex ways; that organisms select environments just as environments select organisms; and that to look for adaptations in every one of our emotions, behaviours, and abilities is simply to misunderstand how natural selection works.

However, most critics and supporters of biological explanations seem to agree on one issue: that if biological determinism were correct, then we would be exempt from critically analyzing and maybe transforming our social practices and institutions (Thornhill and Palmer, 2000, Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler, 2000, Buss, 1999, Rothstein, 1999, Nelkin, 1999, Nelkin and Lindee, 1995, Wright, 1994, Kitcher, 1985). Biological determinism points to natural limits constraining individuals, and therefore tends to de-emphasize the influence of social circumstances. Thus, if biological determinism were true, it would seem that no possible social system, educational policy, or nurturing plan could change the status quo, or at least that doing so would require too great a cost (Wilson, 1978, pp. 132–134). Biology turns out to be a way to justify existing social institutions and to relieve societal guilt. Critics accuse those who use biology to explain every possible human trait of presupposing the truth of biological or genetic determinism. Thus, they try to debunk this doctrine, and with it presumably the claims made by sociobiologists, evolutionary psychologists, or behavioural geneticists. All the while, proponents of these disciplines agree with the claims made by the critics that genetic determinism is false and has problematic implications for our society. Sociobiologists and genetic behaviourists, however, deny that the biological explanations of human nature that they put forward are based on the assumption that human behaviour is genetically determined.

The focus of this paper is to show that those who criticize biological explanations of human nature may be granting too much to those who propose such explanations when they argue that the truth of genetic determinism implies an end to critical evaluation and reform of our social institutions. This is so because when we argue that biological determinism exempts us from social critique we are erroneously presupposing that our social values, practices, and institutions have nothing or little to do with what makes biological explanations troublesome. My argument is, then, that what constitutes a problem for those who are concerned with social justice is not the fact that particular behaviours might be genetically determined, but the fact that our value system and social institutions create the conditions that make such behaviours problematic. Thus I will argue that even if genetic determinism were correct, the requirement of assessing and transforming our social practices and institutions would be far from superfluous. Biology is rarely destiny for human beings and the institutions they create.

Section snippets

Do biological explanations diminish social responsibility?

Many people believe that the answer to this question is a resounding ‘yes’. If we believe that our genes determine intelligence, then there are no good reasons to keep investing our societal resources in improving the intelligence level of those who cannot do better. Similarly, if aggression is a genetic predisposition, then social circumstances seem irrelevant to the production of criminal behaviour. If alcoholism or other kinds of addiction—to drugs, to food, to sex—are in our genes,

Conclusion

For much of our history, biology has been used to justify the status quo. It is not surprising, then, that the renewed interest in biological explanations appears worrisome for those who are concerned with social justice. However, to criticize biological or genetic determinism by pointing out that if it is correct then individuals are not responsible for critically evaluating and maybe transforming our institutions is highly problematic. Such criticisms grant too much power to biology and not

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Gonzalo Munévar and Craig Hanks for their help with prior versions of this paper. I am also thankful to two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.

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