Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Moral responsibility and the continuation problem

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. On the matter of how to interpret “t” in propositions such as these, see Mele (2006), pp. 15–16.

  2. Frankfurt-style cases pose an alleged problem for MR3. I set such cases aside until Sect. 4.

  3. Not all readers should take this bet personally. For example, I would not make this bet with readers who announce their conviction that moral responsibility is possible only in worlds in which determinism is true.

  4. Given the definition in play of basic moral responsibility, this obviously depends on the falsity of the following proposition: all of our decisions are deterministically caused by their proximal causes. Assessing that proposition is beyond the scope of the present article.

  5. Two related errors by Coffman are worth mentioning. First, he misrepresents my critique (Mele 2006, pp. 52–53) of an attempted solution offered by Robert Kane to a problem about luck. Coffman claims that I believe that a certain case of mine “is a counterexample to Kane’s claim” even when certain “monkey business” is eliminated (p. 161). But he is simply misreading what I say (see Mele 2006, p. 52). Second, harking back to a reply in Mele (2007) to a claim made in Coffman and Warfield (2007), Coffman writes: “Mele now recognizes” that premise 3 is incompatible with some plausible claims about a Frankfurt-style case of a kind I discuss in Mele (2006, 2010, p. 164). But the point I am making in the passage at issue from Mele (2007, p. 208) is that in light of the fact that I offer a solution to the problem at issue about indeterministic agency, the incompatibility at issue is no problem for me. To repeat, I reject premise 3.

References

  • Blumenfeld, D. (n.d.). Lucky agents, big and little: Should size really matter? Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9595-z.

  • Clarke, R. (1997). On the possibility of rational free action. Philosophical Studies, 88, 37–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, R. (2003). Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Coffman, E. J. (2010). How (not) to attack the luck argument. Philosophical Explorations, 13, 157–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coffman, E. J., & Warfield, T. (2007). Alfred Mele’s metaphysical freedom? Philosophical Explorations, 10, 185–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. (1995). Autonomous agents. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. (2006). Free will and luck. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. (2007). Free will and luck: Reply to critics. Philosophical Explorations, 10, 195–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. (2008). Manipulation, compatibilism, and moral responsibility. Journal of Ethics, 12, 263–286.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. (2009a). Moral responsibility and agents’ histories. Philosophical Studies, 142, 161–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. (2009b). Moral responsibility and history revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 463–475.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. (2010). Moral responsibility for actions: Epistemic and freedom conditions. Philosophical Explorations, 13, 101–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor, T. (2000). Persons and causes. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, G. (2002). The bounds of freedom. In R. Kane (Ed.), The oxford handbook of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, G. (1987). Free action and free will. Mind, 96, 145–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This paper was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. I am grateful to Randy Clarke and Stephen Kearns for comments on a draft.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

    Alfred R. Mele

Authors
  1. Alfred R. Mele
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alfred R. Mele.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Mele, A.R. Moral responsibility and the continuation problem. Philos Stud 162, 237–255 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9757-7

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9757-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation