In contrast to the traditional view of Kant as a pure retributivist, the recent interpretations of Kant's theory of punishment (for instance Byrd's) propose a mixed theory of retributivism and general prevention. Although both elements are literally right, I try to show the shortcomings of each. I then argue that Kant's theory of punishment is not consistent with his own concept of law. Thus I propose another justification for punishment: special deterrence and rehabilitation. Kant's critique of utilitarianism does not affect this alternative, which moreover has textual support in Kant and is fully consistent with his concept of law.
CITATION STYLE
Merle, J. C. (2000). A Kantian critique of Kant’s theory of punishment. Law and Philosophy, 19(3), 311–338. https://doi.org/10.2307/3505178
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