Meaning and Metaphysics in James

Abstract

THIS PAPER ARGUES, AGAINST A. O. LOVEJOY AND WITH R. B.PERRY, THAT JAMES' THEORY OF MEANING DOES NOT CONFUSECONSEQUENCES OF BELIEVING AND CONSEQUENCES OF THESTATEMENTS BELIEVED. RATHER, I ARGUE THAT JAMES HOLDS THATTHE MEANING OF A SYNTHETIC STATEMENT IS TO BE FOUND IN ITSPERCEPTUAL CONSEQUENCES WHILE CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEVING ARERELEVANT TO 'JUSTIFYING' OVERBELIEFS; THAT IS, TOJUSTIFYING MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS FOR WHICH THE EVIDENCE ISINSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL, NON-PASSIONALJUSTIFICATION. ALTHOUGH THIS THEORY OF MEANING APPEARSANTI-METAPHYSICAL, JAMES DOES NOT USE IT TO RULE OUTMETAPHYSICS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES, ALONG WITH COMMON SENSE,THAT METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES ARE MEANINGFUL; THUS, THEQUESTION IS WHAT METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES MEAN AND NOTWHETHER THEY ARE MEANINGFUL. ALTHOUGH JAMES IS OFTENMISLEADING IN TALKING ABOUT MEANING, I ARGUE THAT THISINTERPRETATION IS SUPPORTED BY HIS NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS OFMETAPHYSICS. PAUL HENLE'S ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A FAVORABLEINTERPRETATION OF JAMES WITHIN LOVEJOY'S FRAMEWORK, IS ALSOSHOWN TO BE INCOHERENT.