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The virtue of cold-heartedness

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Abstract

I defend a strong version of the Kantian claim that actions done solely from duty have moral worth by (1) considering pure cases of acting from duty, (2) showing that love and sympathy, unlike a sense of duty, can often lead us to do the wrong thing, (3) carefully distinguishing moral from non-moral virtues, and (4) by distinguishing pathological sympathy from practical sympathy. Not only is acting purely from a sense of duty superior to acting from love and sympathetic feelings, but the cold-heartedness found in Kant’s examples should be thought of as a virtue rather than a vice.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and religion, University of southern Mississippi, 118 College dr. #5015, Hattiesburg, MS, 39406, USA

    C. D. Meyers

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  1. C. D. Meyers
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Correspondence to C. D. Meyers.

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Meyers, C. The virtue of cold-heartedness. Philos Stud 138, 233–244 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9034-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9034-3

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