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The Problems with Double-Indexing Accounts of the A priori

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Abstract

Inspired by two-dimensional modal logic, some have sought to provide analyses of the notion of the contingent a priori which identify the a priori with truths which have a necessary diagonal. I argue that these analyses fail insofar as they miss the crucial epistemic aspect of the a priori. Augmenting these analyses with specifically epistemic accounts might be possible, but the interest would then reside in these epistemic accounts of the a priori and not in the formal models.

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  1. School of Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia

    Michaelis Michael

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  1. Michaelis Michael
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Michael, M. The Problems with Double-Indexing Accounts of the A priori . Philosophical Studies 118, 67–81 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019543.81077.d2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019543.81077.d2

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