Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-dnltx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T15:45:28.661Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics and Animal Behaviour

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Mary Midgley
Affiliation:
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Every age has its pet contradictions. Thirty years ago, we used to accept Marx and Freud together, and then wonder, like the chameleon on the tartan, why life was so confusing. Today there is similar trouble over the question whether there is, or is not, something called Human Nature. On the one hand, there has been an explosion of animal behaviour studies, and comparisons between animals and men have become immensely popular. People use evidence from animals to decide whether man is naturally aggressive, or naturally territorial; even whether he has an Aggressive or Territorial Instinct. On the other hand, many sociologists and psychologists still seem to hold the Behaviourist view that man is a creature entirely without instincts, and so do existentialist philosophers. If so, all comparison with animals must be irrelevant. (To save space, I have had to simplify both these party lines here, but if anyone thinks I am oversimplifying the behaviourist one, I can only ask him to keep on reading New Society). On that view, man is entirely the product of his culture. He starts off infinitely plastic, and is formed completely by the society in which he grows up.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1973

References

1 Existentialism and Humanism, 28.Google Scholar

2 On Aggression, 3.Google Scholar

3 See The Mentality of Apes, esp. chs vii and viii.Google Scholar

4 Mowat, Farley, Never Cry WolfGoogle Scholar; Murie, , The Wolves of Mount McKinley.Google Scholar

5 King Solomon's Ring, 192.Google Scholar

6 Judges, IX. 5.Google Scholar

7 Schaller, G., The Year of the Gorilla.Google Scholar

8 van Lawick Goodall, Jane, My Friends the Wild Chimpanzees.Google Scholar

9 Republic, IX, 571c.Google Scholar

10 Thus Spake Zarathusira; Discourse Of The Three Metamorphoses.

11 Boswell, , Life of Johnson, Everyman 2, 34.Google Scholar

12 Ardrey, Robert, African Genesis, 126127Google Scholar; Schaller, , The Year of the Gorilla.Google Scholar

13 Tolstoy, L., The Kreutzer SonataGoogle Scholar, ch. ii. For further comparison of human sexuality with that of other primate species, see Wickler, , ‘Socio-Sexual Signals’Google Scholar, in Morris, D., Primate Ethology, 1967Google Scholar. Also, in spite of certain crass and obvious errors, The Naked Ape. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, in Love and HateGoogle Scholar sets the whole problem very well in context.

14 Phaedrus 253256.Google Scholar

15 Nicomachean Ethics 1, 7.Google Scholar

16 Kant, , Lectures on EthicsGoogle Scholar, ‘Duties towards the Body in respect of Sexual Impulse’.

17 Ibid., ‘Duties towards Animals and Spirits’.

18 Mead, Margaret, Sex and Temperament in Three Cultures.Google Scholar

19 Benedict, Ruth, Patterns of Culture, 76.Google Scholar

20 W. H. Thorpe, introduction to Lorenz, 's King Solomon's Ring.Google Scholar

21 Tinbergen, N., The Herring Gull's World, 1953, 68.Google Scholar

22 See Marsden, W., The Lemming Year; W. Elton, Voles, Mice and Lemmings.Google Scholar

23 For the variations, see Rowell, , ‘Variations in the Social Organization of Primates’Google Scholar, in Morris, D. (ed.), Primate Ethology.Google Scholar

24 Jones's arguments may be found well stated by e.g. the distinguished team of anti-ethologists collected in the symposium, Man and Aggression, ed. Montague, Ashley, OUP 1968Google Scholar, and throughout Ashley Montague's own works.

25 Montague, A., Man in Process, e.g. 161Google Scholar, and The Anatomy of Swearing.

26 Rousseau, J. J., Discours de l'Inégalité.Google Scholar

27 For a fuller and more balanced view of the position about ambivalence, see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, , Love and Hate.Google Scholar

28 e.g. in distinguishing the Human from the Holy Will, he explains that the terms of morality apply only to the former, and therefore make sense only under some set of subjective limitations. God's position differs formally from ours.

29 Cf. Warnock, Geoffrey, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 66Google Scholar, with whom I heartily agree.

30 Kant, , Lectures on EthicsGoogle Scholar, paper on Duties towards Animals and Spirits.