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Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”

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  1. University of Connecticut, USA

    Ruth Garrett Millikan

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  1. Ruth Garrett Millikan
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Millikan, R.G. Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”. Philosophical Studies 95, 45–65 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004532016219

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