Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up “What's that?” — It happened like this: The grown-up had drawn pictures for the child several times and said: “this is a man”, “this is a house”, etc. And then the child makes some marks too and asks: What'sthis then?1
The language of philosophers is already as though deformed by shoes that are too tight.2
Abstract
What do we learn about language from reading Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations? This question gains urgency from Wittgenstein's alleged animus against philosophical theorizing and his indirectness. Section 1 argues that Wittgenstein's goal is to prevent philosophical questioning about the foundations of language from the beginning. This conception of his aim is not in tension with Wittgenstein's use of the notion of community; “community interpretations” of his views betray a misguided commitment to the coherence of the idea that language might need grounding. Wittgenstein's goal is not to enjoin us not to step “outside of language-games”, but to show that we have insufficiently clear grasp of the terms we try to use to express the limits of intelligibility. Section 2 suggests that appreciating Wittgenstein's moral concerning the relation between language and philosophizing about it involves allowing him to teach us how to read his book. What makes readingPhilosophical Investigations possible is openness to learning how not to forget our lives in language.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baker, G. and P. Hacker: 1980,Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Cavell, S.: 1976,Must We Mean What We Say, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
Cavell, S.: 1979,The Claim of Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cavell, S.: 1990,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Champlin, T.: 1992, ‘Solitary Rule-Following’,Philosophy 67, 285–306.
Diamond, C.: 1989, ‘Rules: Looking in the Right Place’, in Peter Winch (ed.),Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars: Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees, St. Martin's Press, New York, pp. 12–34.
Diamond, C.: 1991,The Realistic Spirit, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Dummett, M.: 1988, ‘The Origins of Analytical Philosophy’,Lingua e Stile 23, 3–49, 171–210.
Floyd, J.: 1991, ‘Wittgenstein on 2,2,2...: The Opening ofRemarks on the Foundations of Mathematics’,Synthese 87, 143–80.
Goldfarb, W.: 1983, ‘I Want You to Bring Me a Slab: Remarks on the Opening Sections of thePhilosophical Investigations’,Synthese 56, 265–82.
Goldfarb, W.: 1985, ‘Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules’,Journal of Philosophy 82, 471–88.
Kripke, S.: 1982,Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Malcolm, N.: 1986,Nothing Is Hidden, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Malcolm. N.: 1989, ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’,Philosophy 64, 5–28.
Minar, E.: 1986,Philosophical Investigations §§185–202: Wittgenstein's Treatment of Following a Rule, Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University; Garland Publishing, New York, 1990.
Minar, E.: 1991, ‘Wittgenstein and the ‘Contingency’ of Community’,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72, 203–34.
Minar, E.: 1994, ‘Paradox and Privacy: On §§201–202 of Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 45–77.
Stroud, B.: 1990, ‘Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community’, in R. Haller and J. Brandl (eds.),Wittgenstein — Eine Neubewertung/Towards a Re-Evaluation, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna.
Williams, M.: 1991, ‘Blind Obedience: Rules, Community, and the Individual’, in K. Puhl (ed.),Meaning Scepticism, de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 93–125.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1953,Philosophical Investigations, Macmillan, New York.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1969,On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1970,Zettel, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1978,Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Revised Edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1980a,Culture and Value, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1980b,Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1989, ‘‘Philosophie’ §§86–93 (S. 405–435) aus dem sogenannten ‘Big Typescript’ (Katalognummer 213)’, H. Nyman (ed.),Revue Internationale de Philosophie 43, 175–203.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1991, ‘Philosophy: Sections 86–93 (pp. 405–35) of the So-Called ‘Big Typescript’ (Catalog Number 213)’, Heikki Nyman (ed.), trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue,Synthese 87, pp. 3–22.
Wright, C.: 1989, ‘Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics’, in A. George (ed.),Reflections on Chomsky, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 233–64.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Minar, E.H. Feeling at home in language. Synthese 102, 413–452 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064123
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064123