Abstract
A strong, strictly virtue-based, and at the same time truth-centered framework for virtue epistemology (VE) is proposed that bases VE upon a clearly motivating epistemic virtue, inquisitiveness or curiosity in a very wide sense, characterizes the purely executive capacities-virtues as a means for the truth-goal set by the former, and, finally, situates the remaining, partly motivating and partly executive virtues in relation to this central stock of virtues. Character-trait epistemic virtues are presented as hybrids, partly moral, partly purely epistemic. In order to make the approach virtue-based, it is argued that the central virtue (inquisitiveness or curiosity) is responsible for the value of truth: truth is valuable to cognizers because they are inquisitive, and most other virtues are a means for satisfying inquisitiveness. On can usefully combine this virtue-based account of the motivation for acquiring knowledge with a Sosa-style analysis of the concept “knowledge”, which brings to the forefront virtues-capacities, in order to obtain a full-blooded, “strong” VE.
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Notes
The first part of this paper was presented at the Sofia conference on 15 June, 2007. I have profited a lot from the very rich discussion for which I am thankful to the Sofia philosophical audience, especially Elisabeth Fricker and Marina Bakalova. Other parts have been discussed in blogs, and I am thankfully referring to my correspondents in the text. General thanks go to J. Kvanvig, G. Axtel and D. Pritchard for blog hospitality and encouragement. Finally, a great debt is owed to Ernest Sosa; first, in terms of a long-term inspiration with his work and, second, for discussion and criticism. I see my proposal somewhat immodestly as extending his own and supplementing it with a more general framework.
As Julia Annas has pointed out in her text (2003). She also mentions another main disanalogy between intellectual and moral virtues, as against Zagrebski’s idea of “ethical foundations of knowledge”: even if we treat moral virtues as skills, as Socrates and Stoics do, and thus bring them closer to the intellectual ones, the aims of the two groups are too different for a unified account.
The approach would handle the problems posed by Annas (see fn. 2 above) relatively easily, while remaining quite in accord with her general line on virtues: in the good case success crowns the role of executive virtues-capacities and hopefully plays role in the definition of knowledge which appeals to capacities, but is less important for motivating virtues: Ptolemy is as a virtuous inquirer as Copernicus is, although dramatically less successful in terms of comparative truth(-linkeness) of his theory. And the contrast of aims is only to be expected on our account.
Aquinas diplomatically avoids the issue in his comment to the relevant chapter (Book E) of Nicomachean Ethics, but raises it in Summa Theologica.:
“It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (55, 2). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter.” I./II, q. 57
and then answers:
Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. (Ibid.)
For a bit more detail see my review of Brady’s and Pritchard’s volumes on virtue and value (Miscevic 2007).
The clearest case for a value-centered but not value-based epistemology is made by Julie Eflin in her “Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences”. She sees her view as one that parallels ancient virtue ethics in which the agent’s final ends are primary: virtue may be a disposition to act morally, but what actions are moral is not justified in terms of virtue. What is basic is our epistemic goal. Virtues are dispositions to reach goals, but goals are not defined in terms of virtues, rather the other way around: “The characteristics a virtuous inquirer has are those that will fulfill the goal of understanding.” (in Brady and Pritchard 2003:60).
M. Bakalova raised such a possibility in correspondence.
And the critic would also be scorned by Carl von Clausewitz, who discusses the motivating issues at length in Chap. 3 of his classical treatise On War.
We are here considering the cognizer in isolation from social structures of inquiry. If I am part of a research institution, I might, “be motivated at arriving at true belief, because otherwise I will be fired” (thanks go to Bakalova for reminder and example), if I am a private-eye, I might have to investigate other people’s marital infidelities that I find personally very boring and uninterested. Here the curiosity is simply institutionalized.
Alertness is beyond our control, one might object, as did Bakalova in the discussion in Sofia conference. Well, in many cases, curiosity is beyond our control as well, and being under one’s control is not essential for motivating virtue. But I agree that the automatism with which we do get alert makes alertness closer to the “sub-personal level” than inquisitiveness.
One might go even further in discussion and claim with Williamson and Stanley that knowledge how is a subspecies of knowledge that, but I am not particularly enthusiastic about this line.
Horwich (2006) discusses similar issues under the heading of truth goal; I find his remarks congenial, but it is remarkable that he never mentions inquisitiveness, nor the topic of intellectual virtues.
Unfortunately, it is a quote found on and by Google that I could not locate more precisely.
A persistent critic might reply that the phenomenon just described tells against curiosity/inquisitiveness being valuable; if some items are not worth knowing, and some are, then what makes the difference, i.e., the attendant value, lies in them, not in curiosity. Well, if one takes this line, many card-carrying virtues will end devalued: many dangers are not worthy a display of courage, some potential recipients are not worthy of generosity, and others of toleration. So, courage is not always good, nor are generosity and tolerance. One has to admit that the phenomenon of underdetermination is quite general. Alternatively, one follows Aristotle and builds up the discernment itself into the virtue, but then there will be no problem with curiosity: the properly curious person will be curious only about the right matters.
Let me briefly mention a puzzle raised by Michael Brady, in his “Curiosity and the value of truth”, (web): there might be trivial questions in relation to which there is no point in being curious, but that might have surprising and worthwhile answers, and exciting questions which have completely trivial and uninteresting answers. So, curiosity is not correlated with the value of its object: sometimes we are rightly uninterested in a question that has interested answer, sometimes we are rightly obsessed by the question which has uninterested answer. I surmise that the answer lies in the focus of curiosity. Suppose, for illustration, that Thello completely lacks curiosity concerning the whereabouts of a handkerchief that he long time ago offered to his beloved Eudemona; however, if he were to inquire, he would found his present in the hands of Eudemona’s secret lover. Of course, in order for the example to work, Thello must be very interested in whether Eudemona is faithful; otherwise the final result would be as boring to him as the initial question. Inversely, Othello can become terribly interested in the handkerchief of Desdemona, thinking that it conceals a terrible secret, whereas the true answer is, unexpectedly for him, completely trivial. In general, we are curious about more than one topic at a given time, and therefore questions that don’t interest us from the viewpoint of their explicit topic (e.g., handkerchief) can generate answers that interest us a lot from the viewpoint of topics they themselves introduce (e.g., my darling having a secret lover). Inversely, Othello can become terribly interested in the handkerchief of Desdemona, thinking that it conceals a terrible secret, whereas the true answer is, unexpectedly for him, completely trivial.
I tend to agree with Kvanvig (2003, Chap. 6, pp. 140 ff.) that curiositiy is directly linked to truth, and I will talk only about this link here, leaving the thorny issue of the added value of knowledge for another occasion; there, my simpaties are, as against Kvanvig, with reliabilist credit account.
See the fine discussion by C. Elgin in her (2004).
Let me add just a few words about the closest topic, implicit in the formulation of the truth goal, namely about wanting to believe that p only if p. This brings us to the relation between avoiding error and reaching the truth, famously treated as being of equal standing by W. James. It is not clear that their theoretical roles are equal. Reaching truth should be considered the goal of inquiry. Avoiding falsity is a side-constraint or a subordinate goal. The side-constraint is very powerful, and James is right that falsity avoidance can dictate suspension of belief. Avoiding error about p is subordinate to wanting to know p (although in practice we might give first place to error avoidance). However, it is not a goal of equal standing, because it can be explained only in terms of the truth-goal itself: avoiding error is the consequence of the truth goal: believe “p” only if p is part and parcel of “believe “p” iff p”. It is just the “only if” component of the characterization of the truth-goal. Compare the When, lost in woods and very hungry, I look for mushrooms, my overarching goal is to get nourishment. Not getting poisoned enters the picture only in relation to the overarching goal: In this sense it is not a separate goal on equal footing. A good way to look at this is in terms of side-constraint: the goal is to get fed, the side constraint is not getting poisoned. This is relevant to the debate about value monism. The critics of the Goldman variety of veritism, have been quick to point out that giving a high score to finding truth, but low score to avoiding error leads to counter-intuitive results. M. DePaul has presented this as a general problem for truth-consequentialism (2004). I agree with his criticism of Goldman, but I don’t think it is a general problem for truth-centered epistemology. Although the goal or constraint of avoiding error can, should and fortunately often does temper human gullibility, this in itself does not speak against truth-centredness for the reasons just noted: avoiding error is derived from and explainable in terms of truth-goal, and it is the truth-goal that carries the main philosophical weight, even when in practice caution should lead us in situations of uncertainty to give up on envisaged acquiring of some potentially true belief in order not to form a false one. Satisfying curiosity in a proper way involves not ending up with false beliefs about the issue under scrutiny. This is important for linking the truth-goal primarily to inquisitiveness-curiosity whereas the virtue that controls avoidance of error, say epistemic scrupulousness, is to be kept subordinate to the main one.
We might here apply Morton’s idea that cognizers need moral virtues and their epistemic counterparts largely because of their susceptibility to specific emotions (2004).
A further comparison with archery might suggest that the hybrid character of excellencies might be a more general phenomenon. In archery, the motivating virtue is some kind of love of archery in the sporting case, and the motive in the non-sporting case might be bloodthirstiness or simple need to hunt. The primary executive virtue is accuracy, perhaps also the ability to calculate the influence of wind and similar potential obstacles. But there are character-related (supportive) virtues needed in relation to our weaknesses, like perseverance, concentration and dedication. And they seem to be hybrids again: on the one side we appreciate their specific contribution to archery, on the other, they are generally positive character traits. If this holds, our epistemic story is not ad hoc, but points to a wide-spread phenomenon.
An analogy might help. Take any huge enterprise, say, war. The central goal of waging a war is normally victory. It is normally connected to wider goals, either defensive or aggressive, like spreading one’s territory. But not any victory is automatically desirable. Pyrrhic victories, if they deserve the name of victory, are hardly desirable: if your army is so exhausted by the victorious war, that it will fall victim to the first insurrection, the victory is better not to be had. What is wanted are victories that are cheap, and total, then victories in important battles, and so on. Victory is the generic goal. Consider now the qualities needed for waging war. On the one hand we have narrow military abilities that concern fighting itself. They come in two varieties, the motivating virtues, like military zest, perhaps also patriotism, then courage, steadfastness, authoritativeness of character for officers, and the like, and purely executive virtues, like physical endurance, strength, being a good marksman, and the like. But winning a modern war is also a matter of having all sorts of support, prominently logistic and medical support, but also support of civilian population. A good contemporary army general will be very keen on this background support. Finally, a good military doctor is a good military doctor only if he is a good doctor, period, plus if he is particularly adroit at healing, say, wounds, in contrast to being good at plastic surgery. Similarly, cognitive enterprise involves a whole lot of virtues that are only tangentially or indirectly connected to the main goal.
Let me mention two challenges to the idea that character-related traits are ‘merely’ supportive. First, a general challenge: Montmarquet (1993, 2000), maintains that the traits in question are intellectual virtues on account of certain of their internal or psychological features considered in their own right. This account has the advantage of being able to explain the apparent personal worth or value associated with these traits. This is difficult to account for on a model of intellectual virtue (like Driver’s) according to which the traits in question are strictly instrumentally valuable. Answer: Montmarquet’s characterization of internal considerations and features being valuable when considered in their own-right is purely moral; it is thus covered by the moral aspect of a hybrid value.
Second, a particular challenge from moral knowledge and self-knowledge. Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood argue that epistemic virtues are character virtues, “intimately connected” with a person’s emotions. But the example they give have to do with reacting to a scene involving a racial injustice, hardly recognizable by someone not emotionally tuned in.
(web: 9). The example clearly involves emotional sensitivity. But it is a special case, where morality is the topic of the debate and of cognition. If we assume that emotional sensibility is part of the capacity to recognize the moral significance of situations, and I agree with the authors that this is the right move, emotional sensibility will be seen a cognitive (sub-)faculty for the special domain of moral cognition, and there is no wonder it would play a central role there. This does not show that executive epistemic virtues are identical to moral ones, nor does it in itself tell anything about the hybrid view of character-related epistemic virtues like intellectual humility.
The critics might go on to argue that character-related epistemic virtues generally involve the same kind of emotional component, inseparable from their cognitive role, in contrast to the separatist view defended here. An intellectually humble person recognizes emotionally when it is time to retreat, they might continue. And will thus learn more from genuine philosophical authorities, say from Putnam or Lewis, than the intellectually arrogant one: the meek and the humble shall inherit the Twin Earth, as the saying goes.
Answer: epistemic humility involves retreating for epistemic reasons, recognizing the superior intellectual standing of one’s superior. If I simply shut up in a discussion out of moral humility, feeling that continuing the debate would be seen as disrespectful, although it seems to me that I am theoretically right, I don’t exercise an intellectual virtue, but a purely moral one. I might thereby be also exercising an intellectual vice. On the other hand, intellectual humility is cognitively useful and epistemically justified, pointing (fallibly) at the same to a generally non-arrogant character. It thus has epistemic value, and can be of moral interest as well, exactly as the separatist view would predict.
J. A. Carter in his (blog 2006), on Blackburn, presents the modus tollens.
Thanks go to Lizzie Fricker for discussion of this topic.
I am following Mark Johnston and replacing his concept-talk with property talk Mark Johnston defines response-dependent concepts in two steps. First, and most importantly comes response-dispositionality. Start from the standard idea of disposition:
The concept F is a dispositional concept just in case there is an identity of the form
The concept F = the concept of the disposition to produce R in S under C,
where R is the manifestation of the disposition, S is the locus of the manifestation and C is the condition of manifestation. (Johnston 1992:103).
Lewis’s further proposal is the following: “I say that to be valued by us means to be that which we desire to desire” (D. Lewis 1989:116).
I discuss response-dependent properties further in my (forthcoming) paper on Dancy.
There are complicated ways to avoid the Humean result, see for instance Jackson’s strategy in the concluding chapter of From Metaphysics to Ethics, which can be generalized to cover the motivating component of virtue.
Some philosophers (e.g., J. Dancy, M. Little, and M. Lance, personal communication) would say that the second case gives one just response-involving and not response-dependent character; to me the issue seems more verbal than real.
Here is a comparison. Since I am a response-dependentist about (at least epistemic) value, I would compare it to color as secondary quality. Now, the distinction in case of color can be illustrated thus: look this apple is just red, whereas this dress is really white but only looks red because of red light. Put in this way, it sounds like a weak intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: the apple is intrinsically red, the dress is extrinsically, in the circumstances. Again, one might object that the dress is not red at all, but this does not take away the weakly intrinsic nature of apple’s redness.
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Miscevic, N. Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology). Acta Anal 22, 239–266 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-007-0011-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-007-0011-z