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DEFENDING THE COHERENCE OF CONTEXTUALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 May 2014

Martin Montminy  and
Wes Skolits
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Abstract

According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in which they defend their theory.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 319 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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