Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Autonomy, Force and Cultural Plurality

  • Published:
Res Publica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Within now prolific debates surrounding the compatibility of feminism and multiculturalism in liberal societies, the need arises for a normative conception of women’s self-determination that does not violate the self-understandings or values of women of different backgrounds and forms of life. With reference to the recent British debate about forced marriage, this article proposes an innovative approach to this problem in terms of the idea of ‘plural autonomy’. While the capacity for autonomy is plural, in the sense of varying across cultures, autonomy in any world-view involves a capacity to ‘endorse’ one’s decisions in certain crucial spheres of life. Non-endorsement, coercion or force occurs if one risks being alienated from the (cultural) goods and relationships that structure one’s capacity to act in the world. This approach counsels more caution than prominent liberal approaches with respect to negotiating the contested boundary between freedom and force in a diverse society.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The reasons for this may be complex. While one might argue that some non-Western cultures have traditionally valued kinship, spirituality and family ties over possessive individualism, they may endeavour especially to keep faith with these values as a means of coping with social trauma, oppression, colonization or domination (see Tully 1999).

  2. ‘Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures […] because it’s only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their value.’ (Kymlicka 1989, p. 166).

  3. In the best known sections of Philosophical Investigations (ss. 65–67), Wittgenstein suggests that for an important class of terms there exists amongst the referents of a term no single common property, but rather ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ (s. 66). One should not be surprised that this is so, if one considers the way in which the use of terms develops by analogical shifts, by generalisation or specialisation of meaning, or by simple misunderstanding. Wittgenstein’s main example of this point is the concept of a game. There is not one thing that characterises all games; rather, there are ‘family resemblances’—or bundles of shared features from a larger cluster of relevant features. According to Wittgenstein, it is not that concepts can never be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; only that many cannot. As we shall see, I believe we can very broadly specify necessary conditions for autonomy but that the form of these conditions is irreducibly plural.

  4. The Forced Marriage Act 2007 applies in England and Wales only. It supplements the Family Law Act 1996 by enabling courts to create a ‘forced marriage protection order’ (FMPO). Significantly, this protection order differs from general non-harassment orders under the 1996 Act. This is because an FMPO can be requested by ‘interested third parties’ and not only the person suffering the harm.

  5. Raz sometimes makes the weaker claim than that considered earlier that an autonomous person should at least have an ‘adequate’ or ‘viable’ range of options. Her options should not all be: (a) trivial or (b) equally horrendous (1986, p. 374).

  6. As we noted earlier, autonomy is a practical as well as a mental capacity; therefore, even the intrapsychic concept must have some sort implication in terms of practical outcomes for the individual.

  7. Fortunately, the current British law of duress does not only hold that people are only coerced if their actions express mortal desperation. In Hirani v Hirani [1984] 4 FLR 232, in which a Hindu girl had married a man previously unknown to her, and had then left the marriage unconsummated after six weeks, the court addressed the issue not of whether she literally feared for her life, but ‘whether her mind was overborne, howsoever that was caused’. The court nullified the marriage (see Phillips and Dustin 2004, p. 538).

  8. ‘Newnham Asian Women’s Project: Forced Marriage Civil Protection Bill: Response to the Consultation on Amendments to the Family Law Act’, March 2007. Available at http://www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk/documents/NAWP%20forced%marriage%20%Civil%20%Bill%20.pdf.

  9. Ewing (1991, p. 141) describes how change and negotiation takes place in Asian families in terms of ‘jockeying for status and power’ through subtle and nuanced non-verbal communication.

  10. I elaborate on this point in greater detail in Mookherjee (2009). It is worth noting here that, while some believe that the term ‘feminism’, understood as a struggle for women’s equality, was first coined in the 1880s by Hubertine Auclert in the French journal La Citoyenne, by the early 1920s it had been taken up by Egyptian women where it circulated in French and Arabic as nisa’iyaa. These early Egyptian feminists did not accept a liberal world-view, however, as resistance to it was central to their struggle against colonial domination (see Margot Badran, ‘Islamic Feminism: What’s in a Name?’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line (January) available at: http://weekly/ahram.org.eg/2002.596/cul.htm. There is obviously an enormous literature on non-Western feminisms, and I do not attempt to survey it here. My limited point here is that contact with non-traditional ideas can often serve as a catalyst for increased reflection, empowerment and justice, without losing faith in one’s own community.

References

  • Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and equality. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumeister, Andrea. 2000. Liberalism and the politics of difference. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benson, Paul. 1991. Autonomy and oppressive socialisation. Social Theory and Practice 17: 385–408.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhardwaj, A. 2001. Growing up young, Asian and female in Britain: A report on self-harm and suicide. Feminist Review 68: 52–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burke, Jason. 2000. To love, honour and obey—and die. The Observer, October 8.

  • Calhoun, Cheshire. 2008. Losing oneself. Paper presented to the Colloquium of the AHRC Centre for Law, Gender and Sexuality, February 28, Keele University.

  • Callan, Eamonn. 1997. Creating citizens. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Code, Lorraine. 2000. The perversion of autonomy and the subjection of women. In Relational autonomy, ed. Catriona MacKenzie, and Natalie Stoljar, 189–209. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crowder, George. 2002. Liberalism and value pluralism. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deveaux, Monique. 2006. Justice and gender in multicultural liberal states. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dirlik, A. 1990. Culturalism as hegemonic ideology and liberating discourse. In The nature and context of minority discourse, ed. J. Mohammed and D. Lloyd, 50–61. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Gerald. 1989. The concept of autonomy. In The inner citadel, ed. John Christman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Sovereign virtue. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ewing, Katherine. 1991. Can psychoanalytical theory explain the Pakistani woman? Ethos 19: 131–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foner, M. 2005. The immigrant family. In The new immigration: A reader, ed. Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, Carola Suarez-Orozco, and Desiree Baolian Quin-Hilliard. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, Harry. 1988. The importance of what we care about. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, Marilyn. 2003. Autonomy, gender and politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallie, W.B. 1968. Essentially contested concepts. In Philosophy and historical understanding, ed. W.B. Gallie, 157–191. New York: Shocken Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodwin, Robin., and Duncan Cramer. 2000. Marriage and social support in a British Asian community. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 10(1): 49–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gray, John. 1989. Mill’s and other liberalisms. In Liberalisms: Essays in political philosophy, ed. John Gray, 217–238. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hickey, M. 2006. Plans to outlaw forced marriages shelved. Daily Mail, June 7.

  • Hirschmann, Nancy. 1988. Western feminism, eastern veiling and the question of free agency. Constellations 5(3): 345–368.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hirschmann, Nancy. 2003. The subject of liberty. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Home Office. 2000. A choice by right: The report on the working group on forced marriage. Home Office Communications Directorate. http://www.fco.gov.uk.

  • Home Office. 2005. Forced marriage: A wrong not a right. Home Office Communications Directorate http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/race/forcedmarriage/htm.

  • Hundal, Sunny. 2007. Forced marriage farce. The Guardian, August 2.

  • Kukathas, Chandran. 1992. Are there any cultural rights? Political Theory 20: 105–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, community and culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kymlicka, Will. 1993. Reply to Modood. Analyse & Kritik 14: 92–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lomasky, L. 1987. Persons, rights and the moral community. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macedo, Stephen. 1995. Liberal civic education and religious fundamentalism: The case of God v. John Rawls. Ethics 105: 468–496.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mendus, Susan. 2000. Feminism and emotion. Basingstoke: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyers, Diana. 1993. Cultural diversity: Rights, goals and competing values. In Jewish identity, ed. David Theo Goldberg, and Michael Krauz. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyers, Diana. 2000. Feminism and women’s autonomy. Metaphilosophy 31: 469–491.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Modood, T., R. Berthoud, J. Lake, J. Nazroo, P. Smith, S. Virdee, and S. Bestion (eds.). 1997. Ethnic minorities in Britain: Diversity and disadvantage. Basingstoke: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moody-Adams, Michele. 1994. Culture, responsibility and affected ignorance. Ethics 104: 291–309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mookherjee, Monica. 2009. Women’s rights as multicultural claims. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

  • Narayan, Uma. 2001. Minds of their own: Choices, autonomy, cultural practices and other women. In A mind of one’s own, ed. Louise M. Antony, and Charlotte E. Witt. Oxford: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. Sex and social justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Neill, Onora. 1993. Justice, gender and international boundaries. In The quality of life, ed. Martha Nussbaum, and Amartya Sen. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, gender and the family. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Okin, Susan Moller. 1994. Gender equality and cultural differences. Political Theory 22: 658–669.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Okin, Susan Moller. 2002. Mistresses of their own destiny. Ethics 112: 205–230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Okin, Susan Moller., et al. 1999. Is multiculturalism bad for women? Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parekh, Bhikhu. 1995. Education for a multicultural society. Papers for the philosophy of education society of Great Britain 31 March–2 April, 1–10.

  • Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. Rethinking multiculturalism. Basingstoke: MacMilllan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phillips, Anne. 2007. Multiculturalism without culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phillips, Anne., and Moira Dustin. 2004. UK initiatives on forced marriage. Political Studies 52: 531–551.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pichler, Pia. 2007. Talking traditions of marriage. Women’s Studies International Forum 30(3): 201–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pieterse, H.J., P.L. Scheeper, and J.A. Van der Vern. 1999. Religious belief and ethnocentricism. Journal of Empirical Theology 4: 64–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, John. 1987. The idea of an overlapping consensus. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7: 251–276.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raz, Joseph. 1986. The morality of freedom. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodgers, M.E. 2004. Understanding family law. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roland, A. 1996. Cultural pluralism and psychoanalysis. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saharso, Sawitri. 2000. Female autonomy and cultural imperative. In Citizenship in diverse societies, ed. Will Kymlicka, and Wayne Norman, 224–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Saharso, Sawitri. 2006. Is freedom of the will but a western illusion? In Sexual justice/cultural justice, ed. Barbara Arneil, et al., 122–138. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott, David. 2003. Culture in political theory. Political Theory 31: 92–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Song, Sarah. 2007. Justice, gender and the politics of multiculturalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spinner-Halev, Jeff. 2005. Autonomy, association and pluralism. In Minorities within minorities: Equality rights and diversity, ed. A. Eisenberg, and J. Spinner-Halev, 157–171. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Squires, Judith. 2002. Culture, equality and diversity. In Multiculturalism reconsidered, ed. Paul Kelly, 114–132. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sunder, Madhavi. 2001. Cultural dissent. Stanford Law Review 54: 495–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, Charles. 1995. Philosophical arguments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tully, Michele. 1999. Honoring differences: Cultural issues in the treatment of trauma and loss. London: Psychology Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Volpp, Letti. 2000. Blaming culture for bad behaviour. Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 12: 89–116.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wernber, Pnina. 2000. What colour “success”? In Immigration, schooling, social mobility, ed. Hans Vermeulen, and Joel Perlmann. London: Palgrave.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, Amrit. 2007. The forced marriage debate and the British state. Race and Class 49: 25–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Philosophical investigations. New York: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Early versions of this paper were presented at Stirling and Keele Universities. I am grateful to the participants at these venues for their valuable feedback. My special thanks also go to Andrea Baumeister, Gideon Calder, Lynn Dobson, John Horton and Jonathan Seglow for offering important insights and, through them, pressing me constructively to clarify my perspective. This research has been facilitated by a Research Leave Award from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy, Keele University, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, UK

    Monica Mookherjee

Authors
  1. Monica Mookherjee
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Monica Mookherjee.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Mookherjee, M. Autonomy, Force and Cultural Plurality. Res Publica 14, 147–168 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-008-9064-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-008-9064-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation