Abstract
Jaegwon Kim’s principle of Explanatory Exclusion says there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event. Accordingly, if we have a complete neurological explanation for some piece of human behavior, the mental explanation must either be excluded, or it must not be distinct from the neurological explanation. Jaegwon Kim argues that mental explanations are not distinct from neurological explanations on account of the fact that they refer to the same objective causal relation between events. A number of critics have argued that this extensional model of explanatory individuation allows for too many descriptions to state the same explanation. In this paper I consider, and ultimately reject, a possible response to these critics called the Constitutive Property Reply.
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Notes
For Kim, properties are identical if they have the same causes and effects (Kim 1998, p. 105). ‘Being a stabbing’ has different causes and effects than ‘being a killing’, for not all stabbings cause the heart to stop beating, but all killings do (Kim 1976, p. 42). So, we can conclude that ‘being a stabbing’ is a different property than ‘being a killing’. Katz also suggests that co-extensivity is a requisite for Kimian property identity (queryKatz 1976, p. 437). Since stabbings occur in places that killings do not, we can conclude that these properties are not identical (Kim 1976, p. 36–37). We should be careful here, however, for Kim appears to favor the former criterion in his later works.
Kim closes this paper as follows: “We are interested in events primarily insofar as they are objects of explanation and relata of causal relation, and it is by no means false or absurd to say that to explain why Brutus stabbed Caesar is not the same as explaining why Brutus assassinated Caesar; and a specification of the causal conditions for the event given by ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’ need not be the same as one for the event given by ‘Brutus assassinated Caesar’” (Kim 1969, p. 213. See also Kim 1976, p. 36; Kim 1976, p. 45). We are interested in studying events for their explanatory fruitfulness, but there is a great deal of explanatory disparity between the descriptions ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’ and ‘Brutus assassinated Caesar’. The first event does not necessarily explain the proceeding event of the inauguration of a new emperor, as the cut may have been small, or through a toe, or not unto death. The latter fully explains the event of the inauguration of the new emperor; for it leaves no doubt that the old emperor is dead. The first event does not necessarily explain the preceding event of Brutus’ plotting, whereas the latter event does explain this prior event (assuming that all assassinations involve plotting), but stabbings do not necessarily do so.
A number of critics find this required correspondence between causes and explanations in Kim’s explanatory realism as well (McIntyre 2002, p. 95. See also Stueber 2005, p. 253–254). Indeed, Kim often mirrors explanations and causes in his writings. For example, he says “C is an explanans for E in virtue of the fact that c bears to e some determinate objective relation R” (Kim 1988, p. 226; see also Kim 1989, p. 105–106). Kim does not say H is the explanans for W in virtue of the fact that c bears to e some determinate objective relation. He also insists that “correct explanations are correct because they reflect the objectively existent determinative relationship among event ... what makes an explanation correct as an explanation is the fact that it mirrors what's out there independently of our cognition” (Kim 1981, p. 307; emphasis in original. See also Kim 1988, p. 226; Kim 1989, p. 94–96).
I would like to thank Neil Campbell for some valuable discussion and commentary.
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Moore, D. Explanatory Exclusion and Extensional Individuation. Acta Anal 24, 211–222 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0055-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0055-3