The social individual in clinical ethics

J Clin Ethics. 1992 Spring;3(1):53-5.

Abstract

Except for several provocative final sentences, Sigrid Fry-Revere's "A Libertarian Critique of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.'s The Foundations of Bioethics" is not a libertarian so much as it is a philosophical critique. Engelhardt's work has been widely reviewed, and its arguments have been discussed in Fry-Revere's article and elsewhere. Although it would be impractical in this context to undertake the development of a full-scale, philosophical alternative to libertarianism in bioethics, some recent work in philosophy and clinical ethics bears strongly on the challenge that Engelhardt's work represents. In this commentary I will focus on the implications of a certain alternative philosophy -- and by comparison the limitations of Engelhardt's libertarianism -- for one important aspect of clinical ethics: our understanding of the nature of individuality, with special reference to the situation of the patient. I write as an admiring critic of Engelhardt's work, from which I have learned and drawn inspiration....

MeSH terms

  • Bioethics*
  • Cultural Diversity
  • Decision Making
  • Ethical Theory
  • Ethics
  • Ethics, Clinical*
  • Ethics, Medical*
  • Freedom*
  • Humans
  • Individuality
  • Informed Consent
  • Interpersonal Relations*
  • Patients
  • Personal Autonomy*
  • Personhood
  • Philosophy
  • Social Values

Personal name as subject

  • H Tristram Engelhardt